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Restatement of Place*
Mae Kuykendall†
INTRODUCTION
This article will explore the possible fit for a
Restatement project of a large domain of human perception
that pervades legal reasoning as an unstated background
assumption. The domain is that of place, a term that deserves
clarification for this article by comparison with related terms,
such as territory and space. Place as a legal subject brings forth
thoughts of the nation-state, jurisdiction, sovereignty, and the
norms in international law affecting the reach of a sovereign into
the territory of another sovereign. Those concerns are necessarily
touched upon in this article, but the chief objectives are to (1)
illustrate, through a survey of place’s effect in several very
different legal contexts, how ideas about place have influenced
legal reasoning, and (2) evaluate the possibility of making place a
topic around which Restatement principles could be fashioned.
Place, as a factor that is present in law but often not fully seen,
has not been recognized for its theoretical importance as a
viewpoint from which to understand the functioning and
implications of many areas of the law. For example, place may be
present in a legal regime for transactions that have escaped the
hold of any physical place, while the regime is still rationalized
© 2014 Mae Kuykendall. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Director,
Legal E-Marriage Project, http://www.law.msu.edu/marriage/index.html. I am indebted
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emerging set of scholars and disparate disciplines concerned with the investigation of
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Hajivalizadeh, the University of Michigan Law Library (special thanks to Seth
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by an imaginary framework of physical location. Conversely, as
place fades from importance in a given domain of law, placebased views of the subject of those domains can remain a
source of moral framing or legal answers to ambiguous issues.
The law of chattel slavery in the South exemplified the
conceptual complications of place in a period of transition in
cultural arrangements and modes of exchange of property.
Slavery, in particular the American version, was first
rationalized in a place-anchored world, in which masters acting
out purportedly feudal ideals exercised dominion over inferior
beings to whom they provided direct care and the moral
guidance owed by a master to a servant.1 Writings in support of
slavery imagined personal connections between master and slave,
with duties of stewardship justified in moral understandings
drawn from ancient practices and Biblical precepts.2 The legal
treatment of slaves wavered, however, because the legally
abstract right of property, in ordinary cases, was absolute, and
there could thus be no duties between a master and a slave who
lacked legal personhood.3 Thus, some states imposed duties and
prohibitions on slave owners, while others did not.
Simultaneously, however, the law of commercial transactions
made of the slave’s body an un-situated commodity, implicitly
priced in the Liverpool trading market that set a going price of

1 JAMES OAKES, THE RULING RACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS
xi-xii (1982) (explaining paternalism as a blend of strict stratification with a goal of
organic unity in a social order).
2 GEORGE W. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SLAVE-HOLDERS: TWO
DISCOURSES DELIVERED ON NOVEMBER 27, 1836, IN CHRIST CHURCH, RALEIGH, NORTH
CAROLINA 5-7 (Reprinted ed., 1837), available at http://archive.org/stream/
rightsdutiesofsl00free#page/n5/mode/2up (explaining that slavery is “one of the penal
consequences of sin” in the requirement of labor and the necessity of apportioning
supervision of labor to the father, as the head of families who would emulate his
relationship with God in his mastery over his children and inferior beings made to
labor). George M. Frederickson explains religion-derived rationalizations used by
whites to overcome Christian universalism, with the related idea of “one blood,” and
how these whites see themselves as “the natural masters of Africans.” GEORGE M.
FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 46-7 (2002).
3 Many writers have described the evolution over time of the legal treatment
of slaves, with Southern law wavering between a conception of slaves as nothing more
than absolute property to whom no duty could be owed, and as human beings
accountable for their own crimes and potentially protected from willful killing, except
in defined circumstances. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND
THE LAW: 1619–1860 (1996). For a meticulous account of the early recognition of slaves’
humanity and the gradual movement of the law toward denying all protections to
slaves, see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V.
MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003) (analyzing the law’s struggle to explain the
premises of slavery).
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cotton and other slave-produced commodities and intensified the
demand on the slave’s body for rapid production of commodities.4
The struggle of the law to reconcile the claimed moral
underpinnings of slavery with the concept of property, within a
partly feudal society, existed alongside the full development of
the laws underpinning these global commercial transactions. And
the law of commerce ultimately rendered place, and the
sentiments that can hold sway within conditions of proximity and
community, a lost detail in a world of accelerated communication,
market quotations, and the capacity to transmute a human life
into a tradable commodity across distances. Thus, the logic and
law of slavery was bifurcated within the South between the
premises of a place-anchored order that drew upon fading
paternalistic values and a fluid system of mobile capital that
priced slaves as a mobile commodity, available for sale pursuant
to impersonal market logic and with no humane regard for their
embodiment in any place at all.5 The tension between human
beings as property and as intrinsically human began to be
unmanageable and irretrievably incoherent. The conceptual
confusion could not be solved.
Marriage procedure in the early twenty-first century
exhibits a similar logical tension between the moral sway of
physical proximity over a legal arrangement and the sweeping
cultural transitions in marriage meaning and ceremonial
practices that render the place-centered legal regime for marriage
access flawed. As a presumed anchor for creating and regulating
the marital status in law, geography has lost its grounding in the
decisive effect on “community” of physical proximity and limited
mobility. Yet marriage law continues to embrace a literalist
4 WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE
COTTON KINGDOM 249 (2013). Indeed, as Johnson explains,

By 1820, the daily practice of slave traders—gathering information about the
economy by inquiring into the price of cotton in New Orleans, New York, and
Liverpool and the price of slaves in the Upper and Lower South, comparing
them, and making a bet about whether the “market” would rise or fall—was
sufficiently developed to ensure that slave prices in Richmond, Charleston,
and New Orleans would track both one another and the price of cotton (and
to a lesser degree that of sugar) with a remarkable precision. The daily
practice of the slave trade . . . knit a territory that stretched from Louisiana
to Maryland into a single slave economy.
Id. at 41-42; see also OAKES, supra note 1, at xiii (asserting “the profound impact of the
market economy on the nature of slavery”).
5 OAKES, supra note 1; see also JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 11 (describing “the
tension between ‘the South’ as a region of the global economy and ‘the South’ as a
region of the United States of America—by the tension between the promiscuity of
capital and the limits prescribed by the territorial sovereignty of the United States”).
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approach to the claim of territorial jurisdiction over the
solemnization of marriages. At the same time, the culture
increasingly embraces marital connections arising from
mobility, cross-cultural interactions, and marriage ceremonies
severed from a local context. Despite the changing cultural
context of marriage ceremonies, states fail to modify the tie of the
marriage ceremony to physical presence by a couple. States fail to
use their existing power to confer marital status remotely, which
they possess to authorize marriages valid in their jurisdiction and
in as many others as raise no policy objection to the marriage
itself.6 Thus, any prudent procedure to grant marriage status
remotely is as effective as the universal practice of allowing
couples who make a brief visit to a state and who marry during
that visit the benefit of that state’s marriage licensing law.7
Yet the existing geography-based rule requires the use
of a marriage license within the territorial limits of the issuing
state. Exploring the nature of that literalism reveals other
marriage literalisms, including the obsolete use of a creaky “state
interest” in denying marriage comity. The Supreme Court’s recent
rejection of a federal interest in denying recognition to same-sex
marriages for federal law purposes8 reveals the thinness of any
claimed interest by states in territorial control. The sense that
requirements of physical presence in the state that issues a
license somehow protect, for example, a local culture of marriage,
or vulnerable individuals, ignores the widespread mobility
associated with marriage ceremonies performed away from a
home location of the couple.
A geographic skepticism, and awareness, queries the
fading logic of state marriage procedure, which dates from the
early twentieth century. With a skeptical view of stale procedures
that tie marriage formalization to temporary physical presence in
a specified locale, states might experiment with a marriage
regime that lets couples choose their preferred marriage law,
much as corporations elect a governing law for internal affairs at
the time of incorporation. Yet there is little reason for states to
innovate, given the current legislative incentives. States compete
for marriage tourism, and have little motivation or guidance to
devise procedures for their marriage law to be consumed
6 Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 735, 737 (2011).
7 Id. at 795-96.
8 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that the
federal law denying recognition for federal purposes to valid marriages served “no
legitimate purpose”).
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remotely. Lawyers do not have practices connected with entry
into marriage by couples, so there is no natural lobby to seek
law improvement and efficiency. Thus, the assumption that
place and marriage are tightly intertwined continues to be a
default intuition, despite fading logic. An undertaking for
general law improvement through examination of the role of
place in generating legal procedures that do not achieve useful
purposes and impose needless cost provides a template for
innovation to benefit couples who may need access to marriage
law from a distance. An antiquated, unreflective assumption
about place could be removed from the framework of law with
careful attention to the actual benefit of place-anchored
marriage licensing law.
With these examples affecting slave law and marriage
procedure, and as I develop in the body of this article, I
maintain that much of law contains some element of place as
either an overt topic (jurisdiction, justifiable use of deadly
force, regulation of spontaneous roadside memorials), as an
unnoticed intuition, or as a metaphor used without the rigor of
close scrutiny for its capacity to bear analytic weight. First,
however, a concession should be made for the hazards of
attempting to organize and analyze for practical applications in
law the domain claimed by “place” in the human imagination. I
am also on warning of the risks of tautology.9
Insofar as I claim a wide domain for place in law, I risk
either triviality, by confirming something obvious, or analytic
sprawl that defies organization or focus for failure to exclude any
part of the universe. My effort might be thought the opposite of
the originally announced ALI plan of restating the law as an
attempt at simplification.10 But the material in which place is
either an overt or unreflective topic in legal thought is broad, so
the effort to recognize its reach into law, through a partial but
broad set of examples, seems a reasonable effort at assessing its
manageability as a feature of law that could be translated into
a set of principles.
In effect, the undertaking challenges the assumption that
the common law is fundamentally sound as an empirical result of
9 I thank Prof. Bernstein for her stern but kind tutorial on the need for
exclusion of some legal subjects from a vast universe of place-influenced topics and the
need for practical utility of any potential restatement project. Telephone Interview
with Anita Bernstein, Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School (July 13, 2013).
10 Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643,
644 (1933) (citing Radio Program of the American Bar Association announcing President
Wickersham’s address on May 7, 1933, on Restating the Law; an Attempt at Simplification).
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trial-and-error reasoning with cases, and that the restatement
undertaking properly resists the creation of statutory free-hand
abstractions or novel concepts which are necessarily subject to the
cross currents of political contestation and untested by judicial
application and refinement.11 Various topics that have not lent
themselves to restatements and instead have fostered Principles
or Model Codes exemplify the potential for producing principles of
the law of place. Though often controversial,12 Principles projects
create baselines for debate and norms for consideration as
approved by ALI members after wide vetting. Saul Levmore has
offered an excursion into the possibilities of new categorizations
within common law by exploring whether “deception” might be
distinguished as an area of the law, considering what utility
there might be in developing a theory of deception, and
discussing how “natural” categories of law could be identified.13
11 David A. Logan usefully compiles the rationales and summaries offered by
leading figures in the intellectual provenance of the ALI Restatement project. David A.
Logan, When the Restatement Is Not A Restatement: The Curious Case of the “Flagrant
Trespasser”, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1475-78 (2011) (capturing the sentiment
for incrementalism, avoidance of restatement topics that do not arise from
experimentation by judges, and willingness to tolerate an incomplete answer to a
complex problem). Professor Marc Poirier suggests that in an instance of an unnoted
category in law, a statement that adopts advocacy is a good approach. E-mail from
Marc Poirier, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, to author (Aug.
30, 2013, 7:11 EST) (on file with author).
12 Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons
for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 577-79 (2011)
(praising the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation as “a remarkable
achievement,” but suggesting there is continuing conceptual confusion regarding issue
preclusion); William J. Carney, The ALI’s Corporate Governance Project: The Death of
Property Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898, 898 (1993) (referring to the final approval
of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations as “the
most controversial event in the history of American corporate law”); Joel Seligman, A
Sheep in Wolf ’ s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate
Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 328 (1987). For a review of critiques of
the ALI project, as well as specific controversies affecting the Restatement of the Law
of Restitution, see Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process
and Its Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 933, 933 (2008) (concluding that the ALI
attains “consensus doctrine that is accurate and legitimate, yet not frozen in time”).
13 Levmore states:

Deception is a regular feature of matters that give rise to legal conflict, and yet we
do not think of cases with deception or fraud as a common element as doctrinally
related. I will suggest here that they can, in fact, usefully be thought of as a
group. From that observation there follows the more abstract question of why
judges have not thought of these cases as related. The common denominator of
“deception” has not often motivated them to decide cases in ways that take into
account decisions rendered in other deception cases. My aim here is to explain
this sort of narrow judicial focus, or brand of “minimalism” as I will sometimes
call it, and to argue that the reason for this selective minimalism is an important
and unrecognized part of the common [l]aw process. Deception is hardly the only
window to this observation about the common law process, but it is one such
opening and, in any event, the one inspected here.
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So my task in this piece is to provide demonstrative
examples of the presence of place in the construction of law; to
suggest how a rigorous analysis of its presence across dimensions
of law might proceed; and to suggest the manner in which
principles might be shaped to guide law-making or the application
of common law. To avoid the risks of rhetorical tautology, I will
suggest an area of the law in which place is not a presence, and
try to suggest the level of abstraction at which common principles
might be articulated in certain domains of place to advance sound
legal use of place logic. I will also propose a small number of
articulations of principle in a concrete subject area to suggest
how “place” principles might be given form.
Section I of this article will discuss the meaning of “place,”
by juxtaposing it with similar terminologies: territory and space.
In order to begin identifying place as a key component of legal
reasoning, Section II will give a brief overview of place within a
legal context. Section III examines buried assumptions that
emerge over time as an overt category for legal management and
classification and reviews some of the emerging scholarly interest
in place as a background cultural assumption in flux. Section IV
considers metaphors of place that orient perception, and then
does a limited first cut at cataloguing specific uses of place in
law.14 The cataloguing undertaken in Section IV will use
relatively broad characterizations of legal applications of place
reasoning, with tentative labels: micro-identity-intensifying
settings, place-modified citizenship rights,15 and so forth. The
initial listing is meant to invite further theoretical work, devising
the most usable levels of abstraction for organization of a treatise
Saul Levmore, A Theory of Deception and Then of Common Law Categories, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1359, 1359 (2007).
14 Other cataloguing precedes my effort. For example, the chapters in LEGAL
GEOGRAPHIES are an implicit catalogue, but they do not overtly claim a cataloguing
mission. They are provided as a topical exploration of the unexamined category of
space as an entry point into recognizing and “mapping” the deep but unacknowledged
presence of assumptions about space that give law a sense of coherence and stability.
THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER AND SPACE xix (Nicholas Blomley,
David Delaney & Richard Ford eds., 2001). I intend to do a tentative and incomplete
cataloguing as a means of tying this attempt to my own direct review of legal materials
and cultural commentary, with a hope to enrich the available thinking on the
ubiquitous presence of place as an element of law and to stimulate and provoke
interest in further classification and analysis of place across dimensions of its use.
15 See infra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Barack Obama,
President of the United States, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23,
2013), video and transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/
transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-policy.html?_r=0 (explaining the rationale for
lethal strikes on U.S. citizens abroad). Though President Obama argues in the speech
that internal processes of legal review provided due process, one may surmise that no
such claim would be made concerning a citizen present in the United States.
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on place as a legal topic and for further work on the viability of
place assumptions in a world of increasing “displacement,”
through remote communication and digital creations of physical
settings and characters, of literal place as a grounding feature
of lives. Sections V and VI of the article present examples of
particular areas of legal reasoning in which place has figured
particularly prominently, and Section VII provides some
suggestions for statements of principle affecting these place
topics.
I.

PLACE: WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE TERM AND WHAT
IS IT LIKE AND UNLIKE?

A.

Distinguishing Place from Space from Territory

This Part examines the related ideas of place, space,
and territory, all of which overlap but have distinct connotations.
In a primer on place, Tim Cresswell explains that place is
seemingly such a familiar idea that little care is taken to define
its meaning; “Place is a word that seems to speak for itself.”16 In
comparison with space, place is material while space is not.
“Spaces have areas and volumes. Places have space between
them.”17 Even nonexistent place takes on an “imaginary
materiality.”18 For some geographers and their allies however,
space is treated as blank and unarticulated, while place is given a
human quality by its function as a site for (re)producing culture.
For others, by contrast, space might be seen as discursive, and
place as physical, or they may be thought to overlap.19 There is
some lack of consistency in the use of these terms.
Territory, unlike either place or space, has some overt
legal associations. Place and space, by comparison, frame much
legal reasoning, but are not concepts that are themselves infused
with a formal claim about legal authority. They play background
TIM CRESSWELL, PLACE: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 1 (2004).
CRESSWELL, supra note 16, at 8.
18 Id. at 7.
19 E-mail from Marc Poirier, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School
of Law, to author (Aug. 30, 2013, 7:30 PM EST) (on file with author); see also Marc
Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where Is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FIU L. REV.
307, 313-14 (2008) [hereinafter Discursive Space] (citing Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734
A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)) . The New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the Boy Scouts were not a “place” within the meaning of
New Jersey public accommodations law, refusing “to construe ‘place’ so as to include
only membership associations that are connected to a particular geographic location or
facility.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1208-10. As state law, the New Jersey holding is
undisturbed by subsequent Supreme Court review.
16
17
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roles, but territory generates the framework of law. David
Delaney emphasizes the social production of territories and their
contentious roots,20 citing work on the derivation of the word
“territory” that connects its roots to terra, or earth, and terrere,
or to frighten.21 He concludes with a definition meant to be
stripped to descriptive essentials: “As a first approximation, a
territory—regarded in isolation, as is often the case in
definitions—is a bounded social space that inscribes a certain sort
of meaning onto defined segments of the material world.” A
simple territory marks a differentiation between an “inside” and
an “outside.”22
B.

Place as “Situatedness”

Place, or in its meaning as a material or imaginary factor
of human awareness, “situatedness,” is basic to human cognition
and self-definition. As with the human body, place seems a given:
fixed, uncontrived, and objective. As a result, a general challenge
to place as definitive for one’s legal person is not readily stated or
understood. Place, as a measure of “situatedness,” always shapes
the facts law mediates, and as such, place claims a central role as
the background assumption of law.
Reviewing some of the subtleties and ramifications of
embedded suppositions about human situatedness may allow for
recognition of illusions of order concealing complexity. Such
complexity, if disaggregated and organized into defensible
rationales, might yield its mysteries to some progress toward the
goal for which a restatement strives—“comprehensive, rationalist,
universal, and general compilation . . . .”23 Talking about a
Restatement of place can refocus the ALI’s attention on how to
bring coherence and rationality to an unstable underpinning of
much legal doctrine.
Place, for example, defines citizenship,24 and citizenship
defines prospects. In tyrannical countries, place defines a
20 DAVID DELANEY, TERRITORY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 94 (2005). While
conceding that territories provide security to those on the “inside” from those on the
“outside,” Delaney also notes that ideas of territory have led to hundreds of thousands
of deaths in recent years. Id. at 3.
21 Id. at 14.
22 Id. at 14 (elaborating further on the defining powers of a territorial line).
23 Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles and the
Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2001).
24 Complications disrupt the simple association of place with citizenship.
Citizenship can be inherited. For a discussion of the means of gaining citizenship, and a
conception of citizenship as property, see Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, Citizenship as
Inherited Property, 35 POL. THEORY 253, 253 (2007) (calling for increased critical scrutiny
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boundary between human rights and danger. Arbitrary, lifeending power, imposed without recourse for its targets, arises
from the vagaries of one’s place in a moment of time, and from
constellations of power controlling a place and blocking exit or
safe resettlement. Tyranny, war, and famine are features of the
brute power of man or nature to end lives within the confines of
a place, while the outside world, transcending place, views the
endings with concern.25
The stakes place imposes in a federalist nation—such as
the United States today—are less dramatic than the risks and
rewards of one’s assigned place on the global map. They come in
milder forms. Place in the United States means variations in legal
cultures and legal regimes moderated by national commitments
to individual rights.26 The variation in legal rights can be
substantial, as with water and property law across the United
States. By contrast, the domain of contracts is substantially
consolidated as a result of the Uniform Commercial Code. And
procedure varies considerably, as any student studying for a bar
exam is aware.
In addition, some rights do not follow the person in a
federalist system, as has been the case with marriages that are
not portable from one state to another because of a state’s claim to

of jus soli (territoriality) and jus sanguinis (parentage) as a basis for allocating
citizenship, and noting that citizenship is a critical factor in life chances). Further
complications arise where a culture defines citizenship tribally rather than by place; see
DELANEY, supra note 20, at 44-45, or where a group is stateless and homeless, as are
those called colloquially Gypsies, or, more correctly, Roma. For advocacy relating to their
precarious status, see RESTLESS BEINGS, http://www.restlessbeings.org/projects/romagypsies (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). I thank Marc Poirier for pointing to the need to
account for variant means of gaining citizenship.
25 Judith Butler, Neale Wheeler Watson Lecture: Precarious Life and the
Obligations of Cohabitation (May 2011) [hereinafter Butler Speech]. For further
mediations on the political and ethical implications of human vulnerability, see JUDITH
BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWERS OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE (2004).
26 The just-decided case of U.S. v. Windsor provides the germ of an idea about
the limitations of place in marriage: though the federal government through Congress
“can make determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges,” United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013), territorial sovereignty does not allow it to do so in
a way that targets a class of people to diminish their rights. Id. at 1292. States may
directly control the definition of marriage within their boundaries, but, like the federal
government, states are restrained in their territory-based claims of control by the
requirement to “respect the constitutional rights of persons.” Id. at 2691. Somehow state
territory rules marriage as part of a presumed natural order in which the Constitution
allocates control of marriage to states in accordance with a map and in which the federal
government may play a supplementary role. But within the entire territory of the United
States ideas about individual rights supersede claims based on assertions of any scale of
territorial “final say.” The level of U.S. protection for rights of persons gradually places
marriage outside of the logic of place as the author of personal fate.
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a policy interest in negating the marriage.27 With the recent
announcement by the Obama administration that federal
recognition of marriage will be based on a couple’s choice of a
place of celebration, without regard to non-recognition treatment
in their state of residence, the iron control of place over marriage
status is waning, with relatively little recognition of the extent
of the sea change in the local, place-based hold over the
incidents of marital status.28
At various times, place in the United States meant a lack
of basic rights for African-Americans—to move to a state as a free
black citizen, to vote, to own property protected by law, to call
upon law enforcement for protection, or, when slavery existed, to
have a fair chance at forming an autonomous life with family and
friends. In many Southern states, place meant the power to
banish freed slaves;29 place, as comprehended as territory, and
control of territory as control of culture, was incompatible with
their presence.30 Today, place can mean subjection to harsh laws,
harshly enforced. Or it may mean subjection to violence
unchecked by police intervention or unpunished by retrospective
accountings.31 Place in the United States can still be dangerous
to the flourishing of life.

27 Mae Kuykendall, Equality Federalism: A Solution to the Marriage Wars, 15
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377 (2012).
28 For a piece pointing to a future for forms of marriage portability that overcome
place in our federalist system, see Mae Kuykendall, The Converging Logic of Federalism
and Equality Logic in Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y (Sept.
2012),
http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/the-converging-logic-of-federalismand-equality-in-same-sex-marriage-recog. For a distinctive examination of the theme of
localism in United States v.Windsor, see generally Marc Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” in
United States v. Windsor: Power, Localism, and Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014).
29 KENNETH
M. STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 94 (1989) (describing a master’s offer to free his slaves contingent
on their leaving both the state and the United States), 232-33 (enumerating state
provisions restricting manumission and requiring freed slaves to leave the state within
a specified period and, in some instances, the United States).
30 A transition in sovereignty can result in the elimination of property rights
and the right to dwell, often worked out against subject populations along lines of race
and ethnicity. See, e.g., MARÍA E. MONTOYA, TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL
LAND GRANT AND THE CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1840–1900 107,
113, 128 (2002) (explaining ejection suits).
31 Frank Perez, After UpStairs Lounge Fire, Gay and Straight New Orleans
Changed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 22, 2013 8:55 AM), http://www.nola.com/opinions/
index.ssf/2013/06/after_upstairs_lounge_fire_gay.html (describing the “cruel” media
coverage and the “dismissive police response” to an arson of a gay New Orleans club
that caused 32 deaths, mainly of gay men).

768

II.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

THE LEGAL LOGIC OF PLACE: PLACE AS A FUNCTION OF
LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF ORDER, SEPARATENESS, AND
CONTROL

A broad conception of the Restatement undertaking
would be engaged by examining place as a topic for legal
classification. Place does not present itself as a legal domain in
the manner of the overtly legal doctrine with which the
Restatement project bears an association.32 An attempt to
catalogue, and then restate, the uses of place as a basis to define
legal rights and obligations challenges the boundaries of the
Restatement world of contained abstraction about pre-labeled
bodies of legal concern33 brought together by a simple conceptual
grouping: injury, promises, ownership, family forms—that is, areas
of common law. Restatements, nevertheless, confront what
Professor Anita Bernstein has called “a wilderness of Nature,” a
mass of material that lacks the manifest rationalizing force of
“comprehensive, rationalist, universal, and general compilation.”34
Place is the wilderness of human cognition left at a loss for guiding
principles that assign a moral weight to considerations of distance,
exclusion, and proximity across virtually all dimensions of law.
Legal scholarship on place has sought to identify the role
of the nation-state as a critical influence on legal conceptions of
place, in which a nation-state asserts a power coextensive with
territory yet operates in a complex conceptual framework that
allows for competing narratives for addressing specific legal
problems.35 Law and geography scholarship has focused on the
authority of the nation-state and on the capacity of territorial
logic to properly “scale” problems of justice. “Scaling” proposals
seek to draw legal boundaries relationally, and deny that territory
is only spatial. Rather, “relationship” is posed as “the conceptual
core” of territory.36 The normative goal is to achieve just
resolutions for those not neatly located in a legal space defined by
territory as a controlled space, with a concern for social justice for
32 Bernstein, supra note 23, at 1369-70 (suggesting, in connection with the
Tort General Principles draft, that “the premise is that once accurately perceived, an
object of gaze—for the ALI mainly decisional law, with statutes and scholarship
occasionally included—will reveal its inner logic and coherence” (footnote omitted)).
33 Id. at 1389-90 (noting the tradition of drawing restatements from a narrow
band of decisional law in an area of law, as well as a trend toward a diversity of sources
for Restatements, or “[p]luralistic materials”).
34 Id. at 1370.
35 Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from
Property and Criminal Law, 13 VILL. L. REV. 117, 120-21 (2008).
36 Andrea Berghenti, On Territory as Relationship and Law as Territory, 21
CANADIAN J. L. & SOC’Y 65, 67 (2006).
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those classified as “other.”37 At the same time, broader efforts at
classification have emerged.38
The simplest conception of place as an element of lawful
force and control—a dominant sense of reality—is of an inert,
bounded physical territory subjected to a state’s assertion of
control over its governance.39 As recently renewed and reemphasized by the Supreme Court, the sovereign claim over a
territory is heavily presumed to be incompatible with the exercise
of jurisdiction by another sovereign to enforce a norm of
international law that occurred in the other sovereign’s
territory.40 Intrusions into the territory are subject to the
sovereign’s control and limited international norms, such as safe
passage and security for diplomats.41 That simple conception has
become a strong understanding in the law of nations, despite a
complicated historical evolution in claims of authority over large
expanses.42 Challenges to the naturalness of territorial
conventions affecting sovereignty have become commonplace in
scholarship, but remain relatively marginal in law. A powerful
example is contained in the writings of David Delaney, one of a
group of imaginative scholars who examine anomalies of
geography, identity, and law:
Greater attention to discourse and discursive practices . . . would
complicate the (more or less) transparent model of communication that
informs [Robert Sack’s classic 1986] Human Territoriality. It complicates
our understanding of how territorializations give expression to the
relationships between power, meaning, and experience. Attending to
Osofsky, supra note 35, at 118-19.
See THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER AND SPACE , supra
note 14, at xiii (referring in the preface, Where is Law?, to “how far removed we are
from the spatio-legalities of the century before last”).
39 LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN
EUROPEAN EMPIRES 1400–1900 1-39 (2010) (bringing a new perspective to the understanding
of mapping and law). As is suggested throughout this article, that dominant influence of place,
meaning location, as an element of law loses much of its intuitive force with
telecommunications. Many puzzles arise in the absence of clear grounding on the physical
earth. Where did an act of fraud occur? Where did defamation occur? What community should
be understood to apply community standards? Specific answers can be devised for selected
questions, as a sort of ipse dixit of the controlling law-giver/applier, but a general logic of
community would provide a hope for coherence in legal control over accountability.
40 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 1664-67 (2013)
(emphasizing the presumption against extraterritorial application of a U.S. law or
international law by a U.S. court in the absence of clear indication in the statute of
intended extraterritorial reach and citing Blackstone on the limited offenses that
existed against international law at the time the Alien Tort Act was passed). See
CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2008) (referring to an
aspiration for justice without the constraints imposed by territorial borders).
41 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
723 (2004)).
42 See BENTON, supra note 39, at 1-39.
37
38
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discourse in this sense allows us to regard territorial complexes—such as
those through which race and gender are expressed—more in terms of
their cultural and historical particularities, and to situate specific
practices, such as segregation, deportation, eviction, or confinement, less
in terms of intentional strategies of rational actors and more in terms of
cultural performances.43

In this vision, the formal, logical reasoning that
apportions sovereignty between territorial domains, creating
presumptions between sovereigns whose will is understood as
derived from something more grounded and core to legal
authority than “cultural performances,” becomes peripheral to the
human stakes in a world of “precarity” of the human condition.44
In a world organized by territorially inscribed “cultural
performances,” rules created by the identification of territoriality
with sovereign legal dignity45 ignore human stakes of the sort that
newer scholarship and political forces attempt to advance and
protect.46 Casting his vote with the human beings put at risk by
DELANEY, supra note 20, at 94.
Butler Speech, supra note 25 (referring to “every political effort to manage
populations [as involving] a tactical distribution of precarity”).
45 The idea of the “dignity” of a sovereign has made an appearance in
American federalism as explicated by the Supreme Court. Justice John Roberts has
introduced into the vocabulary of federalism the term “equal dignity” of the 50 states,
awarded to them on the basis of sovereign status. Indeed, there is a brewing clash
within the Supreme Court. Even as Justice Roberts develops a concept of the “dignity”
of state sovereigns, see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013)
(emphasizing the constitutional right of states to equal dignity), Justice Kennedy is
working to develop a core notion of personal dignity that might overcome the claims of
states to control the definition of marriage and thus to exclude same-sex couples in the
name of the dignity of the state. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689,
2692-94 (2013). The sense that Justice Kennedy is more poetic than legal in fashioning
a doctrine of personal dignity gains its strength from the intuition that preservation of
the sovereign dignity of law-giving states is superior to, and more grounded in
something with solidity, than a theory of the personal dignity of persons under the
United States Constitution. I am grateful to Marc Poirier for prompting this
comparison. For a discussion of the novelty of the comparative dignity rubric for states,
see generally Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE J. ONLINE 175 (2013).
46 A good example of such a critique, in a recent specific context, concerns the
use of the logic in Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), regarding extra-territoriality and
sovereign dignity:
43
44

Rather than obsessing about the bounded nature of state sovereignty and hiding
behind self-interested concerns to avoid interference in the internal affairs of
sovereign competitors, local communities who suffer from transnational
environmental harms understand the reality of global interconnectedness, both
ecological and economic. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
sustainable development and the “e-word” [meaning extra-territoriality] are
concepts invoked to solidify the ability of host states in both north and south to
exploit resources ostensibly for the good of their peoples. Yet, if we are truly
concerned with sovereignty of the people, we must as a global community
encourage if not require our courts to provide a space for local communities who
wish to both prevent and remedy intra-territorial environmental harm with a
chance to voice their concerns. This is something that the ATS was clearly not
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territorial-based sovereignty, Delaney dedicates his book: “For
those who are unjustly excluded, expelled, confined, or
invaded.”47
Today place is increasingly understood as having multiple
meanings, and proximity as posing as many puzzles as paths to
insight. Both contemporary scholarship about the evolution of
sovereignty48 and the manipulability of place perception by
technology pose questions about the organic connection of law’s
domain to the physical earth.
Place as an implicit presence in much of law attracts
ethical concerns by critics of the nation-state. In their view, states
claim a territorial imperative that facilitates and may even
promote population displacement and occupation, resulting in
recurring crises that allocate the “precarity” of the human
condition to some groups while insulating others.49 At a micro
level, place situates embodied expectations and group behavior,
some of which are enforced by legal rules.50 The privilege in some
states of “standing one’s ground” with lethal effect allocates rights
and inflicts loss, defining the micro-parameters of control over
place in public. Hence, place constantly allows for settlements of
ambiguities and anomalies that might foster legal loss of nerve if

designed to do. Kiobel, due to its problematic invocation of the “e-word”,
encourages us to pretend we live in a world built around impermeable sovereign
borders, thus inhibiting our ability to take responsibly [sic] across borders as
members of a global community sharing one earth.
Sara Seck, Kiobel and the E-word: Reflections on Transnational Environmental
Responsibility in an Interconnected World, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (July 5, 2013, 11:25
AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/sara-seck-on-kiobel-and-e-word.html.
47 See DELANEY, supra note 20, at dedication page.
48 Id.
49 Butler Speech, supra note 25. The extent of insulation can vary by place. In
her book meditating on geography and identity, novelist Mary Gordon, in considering
her security in a life, and a place, given to her by a university by admitting her and
then fostering her career, describes the withdrawal that place can provide from the
hazards faced by the less fortunate, and the smugness that may go with insulation
from “precarity”:
How do I speak of all of this? How, without incurring the suspicion that,
accompanying the joyous click of the tongue in the lock’s groove of a beloved
New York apartment, is an automatic sense of triumphalism? A smug “I’m
here, therefore you’re not.” A satisfaction, like the ripple of an ocean breeze,
of possession and exclusion.
MARY GORDON, SEEING THROUGH PLACES: REFLECTIONS ON GEOGRAPHY AND IDENTITY
254 (2000).
50 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF
THE PUBLIC ORDER (1971).
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place did not appear natural and inevitable as a driving
rationale for much of law.51
Conceptually, place is of increasing interest to a variety
of scholars.52 Historians have long studied the connection
between perceptions and mapping of territory and the
establishment of empire and the development of law.53 In the last
30 years, place as an anchoring feature of identity, cognition, and
grounding in the world has been in flux. Puzzles about place in a
world of wide mobility and disembodied life on the internet
attract attention from a wide variety of disciplines. For example,
architects and artists have noted the malleability of space and, in
art, the “waning” of the human body from representation. One
scholar has led tours through museums to demonstrate the
“absence” of the body in one outlet for the human impulse to
portray the critical visual components of the world as perceived.54
Architects examine the increasing manipulation of design to
channel behavior by shaping environments to conceal the forms of
control being exercised.55 Psychologists investigate the
commonality between the patterns of stalking in the physical
world
compared
with
cyberstalking.56
Ethicists
and
“transhumanist thinkers” address the implications of reconfiguring the human body with machine parts, thus moving
toward a “posthuman” future.57
That flux’s form and effects on human culture are difficult
to capture and evaluate. In many venues, the “displacement of
place” is portrayed as a positive, transformative linking of
51 For a provocative argument that the “expressive topography” in American
life, meaning physical areas widely open to expressive liberty, is shrinking under the
force of sovereign control of the spatiality of expression, see TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT
OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 2-3 (2008).
52 An indication of growing interest in the legal academy can be detected in
the forthcoming program of the American Association of Law Schools (AALS). The
Conflicts Section of AALS will present a program on “The New Territorialism and the
Supreme Court.” The program will include talks “across a range of substantive and
methodological fields,” including extraterritorial financial regulation, territorialism’s
history, status and place in transnational tort, and governance in cyberspace. General
e-mail from Louise Weinberg, William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice,
University of Texas School of Law, to Federal Courts listserve (Dec. 13, 2013 10:58 AM
EST) (on file with author).
53 See BENTON, supra note 39, at 1-6.
54 Taylor Marsh, Figuring Absence: The Waning of the Body in Contemporary Art
(Dec. 15, 2012) (Gallery Talk at the Arthur M. Sackler Museum, Cambridge, Mass.).
55 Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 5-7 (2005)
56 L. P. Sheridan & T. Grant, Is Cyberstalking Different?, 13 PSYCHOL. CRIME
& L. 627-40 (Dec. 2007).
57 Editorial, Ethics: The Questions Posed by Our Bionic Bodies, OBSERVER (June
15,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/16/observer-editorialbiotechnology-ethics (suggesting science is pushing us to a “posthuman future”).
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humanity and empowerment of individuals. In other views, the
loss of place and the technological transcendence to a boundaryless space is criticized as a new source of danger: loss of grounding
in a human context, anonymity as a means of harassment and
targeting minorities, and potential for increased authoritarian
control over the entire population of the globe.58 Additionally,
there is intuitive concern that core celebratory moments lose
constitutive and spiritual force if they are not embodied in
moments of shared physical presence.59 If law is for the purpose
of lending order and fairness to human activity, legal principles
would benefit from a basic re-examination of place as a driver
of law reasoning and law-backed power. The law surely has a
role to play in sorting the legitimate role of place in protecting
human welfare and the oppressive role of mere proximity over
vulnerable humanity.
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF UNNOTICED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT
PLACE IN LEGAL REASONING: FROM INVISIBILITY TO
CONTESTATION AND CLASSIFICATION

Putting aside contested visions of a less “rooted” world,
place simply recommends itself as a study of legal anomalies
and unexamined organizing precepts that enable law to appear
plausible without the need of deep ongoing inquiry into the
metaphysics or phenomenology of legal rules.60 Place is the
58 The recent book by Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE:
RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF PEOPLE, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 3-4 (2013), typifies the
visionary, optimistic view that the partial “displacement of place” is empowering and
transformative. The response by Julian Assange to the book, The Banality of ‘Don’t Be
Evil’, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013, at SR4, captures the sense that control of the internet
is control of human liberty.
59 In fact, one scholar posed queries about the importance of “rootedness to place”:

One way to approach this is to think about the parameters of place—in what
situation is place imperative? I cannot envision a funeral without place—a
service by satellite alone. Could a jury preside without a jury box? Could you
empanel a jury who served in front of their individual computers, watching
the proceedings and deliberating by video conference? It seems wrong. Does
the right to confrontation mean the right to confront . . . on a video screen? If
we balk at the concept of any of these proceedings without “place,” then the
question is where the boundary is? How far can we move beyond the
rootedness to place and still survive intact, being torn asunder?
E-mail from Ruth Mendel, Independent Scholar, to author (June 1, 2013, 11:03 PM) (on
file with author) (paragraphing omitted).
60 The “Who Am I” or the “What Are We” or “What Is Reality” questions of
literature and philosophy are beyond the capacity of law to divine or incorporate, yet
they lurk in the imposition by law of a core yet unreflective understanding of the world,
with unstated reference to place as the key element in pragmatic deployment of
comprehensibility and justification in law. See THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW,
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strongest example of a deep orienting assumption that lacks a
cohesive rationale other than metaphors embedded in basic,
relatively unreflective thought. Its claim over the apportionment
of legal authority, or jurisdiction, even where extraterritorial
governmental action affecting rights protected by domestic law is
involved, is “tenacious.”61 As one scholar has written, an
approach to rights that “privileges territorial sovereignty as the
primary organizing principle of legal and political relations”
remains highly influential in the conduct of sovereigns and the
courts within them, despite scholarly recognition that “the reality
of human interaction is chafing against the strictures our current
conception of legal jurisdiction imposes.”62 She concludes that
judges are unlikely to abandon a primary conception of territory
as determining what domestic law constrains governments when
they act outside their territory, while indicating that judges may
occasionally seek to find a just resolution without overtly
challenging the conceptual sway of territory.63 A deeply original
and sophisticated examination of the historical relationship
between geography and law, by Laura Benton, disrupts the
narrative of law and territory as wedded through the assertion of
sovereignty by empires, with law and cartography developing
together as a rationalizing force.64
With the passage of time, certain buried assumptions
become less fixed than in a period when social understandings and
practices obscured them. The example of marriage statutes written
without specification of the sex of the participants is a simple
example. Sexual difference as a requirement was unexamined and
barely even assumed. Reproductive pairings were sufficiently
POWER AND SPACE, supra note 14, at xiv-xv (relating Where is Law? to Who are We?
and noting “[u]nacknowledged assumptions about space that work to stabilize the
validity of seemingly obvious propositions, identities”).
61 Courts resist the invitation to extend rights defined domestically beyond
their borders:
The factors affecting a national court’s willingness to find that domestic
rights reach beyond national borders in a particular case are, indisputably,
multiple and complex. That said, this study reveals the perhaps surprising
tenacity of country-based reasoning that privileges the role of territory, even
in an age of “globalization.” Scholars, advocates, and policymakers would be
well advised to take into account the stickiness of territorially based
conceptions of domestic rights and obligations in proposing more expansive
interpretations.
Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 58 (2011)
(indicating “the entrenched political and legal significance of national boundaries”).
62 Id. at 63 (quoting Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 543 (2002)).
63 Id. at 57-58.
64 See BENTON, supra note 39, at xi-xii.
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pervasive as a social pattern seemingly driven by basic biology—
gender as a binary associated with reproduction—that the legal
grounding of marriage in gender went unnoticed. The potential
malleability of the gendered body and of sexual attraction was not
available for examination by lawmakers or judicial decisionmakers.65 For history, the implicit gender arrangements can be
analyzed using a variety of interpretive approaches with elements
of theory about power and the like, but the legal rules have
needed little deeper theory or classification in connection with
the binary assumptions about marital pairs.
Until the assumption of sex as an organizing category for
marriage was disturbed, the deeply embedded feature could bear
the moral weight that, unexamined, it readily supported. After
changes in technology made the variety in human sexual and
family connections visible and open, the unstated parameter began
to weaken, to require heated defense, and finally, to lose the moral
force that made it persuasive. The disruption of an unseen part of
legal rules has opened up the marriage category for new taxonomic
work. Today, the gender feature of marriage plays a role at the
entry stage that varies across jurisdictions66 and has placed in flux
the mediating rules about obligations within marriage.67 Hence, the
gender component of marriage can now attract a larger project to
create a taxonomy of the role of gender, or gender replacements, in
marriage. The universe of variation, however, remains contained
within the category of marriage.
Could place experience a similar exposure of its
weakening logic in a world of mobility, instant communication
severed from embodiment of the human person, newly understood
historical complexities associated with the conquest of place and
the assumed authority of a legal hierarchy over the local
inhabitants,68 and skeptical treatment by scholars of control over
territory as a basis for asserting authority?69 Is place amenable to
refreshed taxonomic work in law that guides legal applications of
logic relating to embodiment, location, or place metaphor? And is
65 JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE xxv (1995)
(referring to heterosexuality as a “suppressed parameter” of the meaning of marriage
in the modern West).
66 PETER NICOLAS & MIKE STRONG, THE GEOGRAPHY OF LOVE: SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE & RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (THE STORY IN MAPS) 9 (3d ed. 2013).
67 See James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family:
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L.
REV. 923, 923 (2001) (asserting that “[t]he task of bringing coherence and consistency
to family law is truly daunting”).
68 RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS
IN THE GREAT LAKE REGIONS, 1650-1815 xxv (2d ed. 2011).
69 See BENTON, supra note 39, at 30-33.

776

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

the fact that much of the mediation and reading of place arises
from legislation rather than the development of common law an
obstacle to a search for principles on which law can be
rationalized and improved? This article seeks to answer these
questions with an unequivocal yes, yes, and no.
IV.

PLACE AS METAPHOR: IDENTITY, PERCEPTION, MEMORY,
POWER

In contrast with assumptions about the gendered nature
of marriage, place is both ubiquitous, as an unanalyzed
background for legal doctrine, and nonobvious in the form of its
various applications to law. Its influence is pervasive but
unanalyzed as a category outside the specific topics in which it
plays a role. Recognizing place as a feature of legal doctrine,
incorporated without critical scrutiny or reflection, and thus,
inconsistent in its logical role in different doctrines, invites an
initial effort at taxonomy. One may, without an attempt to
fashion a deep theory of place as an organizing perceptual or
morally relevant category, begin to “map” the occurrence of
place in law and to detect the way that place serves to allocate
identity, blame, reward, movement, and haven.
As brute fact, place is, as part of our cultural memory, a
fact that dominates any vision of the human subject. As
metaphor, it carries meaning associated with hierarchy (“power
and place,” “high place,” “first place,” “a woman’s place is in the
home”), social fit within a structure or in circumstance (“out of
place,” “above one’s place,” “the wrong time and place,” “stay in
your place,” “another place and time,” “place in the sun”),
ownership or control (“my place,” “our place,” “holding a place,”
“place holder”), and perspective (“Put yourself in my place,” “in a
bad place”).70 Place, by means of design, is subject to alteration in
ways that are subject to human agency while seeming not to be a
product of agency. Hence, place molds the human subject by its
totality and seemingly fixed character, even as the construction of
place by agency and its unstated domination of legal categories
is marginal as an overt subject of law.
This role of place in affording comprehensibility renders it
central to much legal doctrine. Its centrality is opaque, providing
grounding for the legal imagination from hidden nooks in the
abstractions that grow from assumptions of physical proximity or
70 Cresswell notes similar conversational uses of place. CRESSWELL, supra
note 16, at 1-2.
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distance, “meetings” of minds, proximate cause, a duty to retreat,
an arm’s length negotiation, or a right to stand your ground. Here
I attempt an orienting statement about place in legal materials:
Place connects human perception to basic features of existential,
or concrete, contact with an outside actor, force, or location,
ordinarily through physical proximity but, possibly, through
imaginary proximity.71
A.

Staking Claims of Sovereignty

Place grounds views about sovereignty, moral claims
over territory, the status of the occupants of a claimed territory,
and nationhood as defined by physical expanse. Today, affinity
groups often have stronger bonds of loyalty and commonality than
do collections of human beings who share a physical location. Yet
citizenship and nationhood remain defined by location in much of
the contemporary imagination. The online game Cyber Nations
unreflectively announces:
Cyber Nations is a free persistent browser-based nation simulation
game. Create a nation and decide how you will rule your people by
choosing a government type, a national religion, tax rate and more.
Build your nation according to your choosing by purchasing
infrastructure to support your citizens, land to expand your borders,
technology to increase your effectiveness, and military to defend your
national interests.
Develop improvements for your nation such as harbors to enhance
your ability to trade with other nations, build clinics and hospitals to
increase your total population, and invest in schools and universities
to increase your people’s literacy rate. Finance national wonders like
great temples and monuments for your citizens to marvel at, develop
movie industries to increase your population’s happiness, or expand
beyond the confines of this world by building colonies on the moon
and mars [sic] to open up rich opportunities for your nation. It’s all
up to you.72

While nations are mainly physical and bounded,
metaphor has helped to define the human in terms of place.
The fifteenth century mystic and jurist Nicolas of Cusa used a
metaphor of man as a cosmographer, or mapmaker, and his
mind as a city73 with gates through which the senses entered.74
71 Note that Creswell describes “imaginary place” as having “imaginary
materiality.” Id. at 1.
72 CYBER NATIONS: A NATION SIMULATION GAME, http://www.cybernations.net/
(last visited July 5, 2013) (emphasis added).
73 VICTORIA MORSE, THE MAP AS A METAPHOR FOR ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE BY
NICHOLAS OF CUSA (1999) (translating and commenting on NICHOLAS OF CUSA,
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As a mystic, Cusa had a larger goal than theorizing sensory
input,75 but his core idea depended on an understanding of a
human being as a situated “city” with gates, indicating
proximity to something that could enter the gates, and
dependent on the senses to process the world. Place was
dominant for such a conception of the human subject.
The American mystic Ralph Waldo Emerson similarly
focused on the organ for sight—the transparent eyeball. Unlike
Cusa, Emerson began to hover above the situatedness of the
single sense that he named as primary to the human soul.
Emerson anticipated, with his experimental treatment of
something he called the Over-soul, the fragmentation and
simultaneous expansion of human subjectivity from grounding
in a physical place. Emerson evoked an abstracted location
created by a common human access to thought, transmitted
without direct contact yet defining of the human subject.
Rather than Cusa’s city with gates, Emerson imagined a
universal eye, roaming across time and place. Emerson’s
writing is devoid of writing about law. Yet his conception of the
possible form human connection might take prefigures the
impact of technological change on human consciousness as an
unembodied merger of minds.76
The Over-soul may not have legal problems, but the
hovering Cloud of the late computer age brings collisions of
legal interests that would dismay the genteel Emerson’s
aspirations for a unified human understanding without direct
contact among the human composition of the unity. At the same
time, Emerson’s preference for abstraction had implications for
how the concrete world, in its physical proximities, could establish
embodied institutions meriting respect or direct engagement. In
his sense of removal from engagement, Emerson foreshadowed a
possibility of place receding as a guiding concept for legal
obligation or moral imperative.
Finally, a second American “mystic,” President Abraham
Lincoln, offered a reading of a nation that relied on an insistence
on a deep moral component of territorial bounding:

COMPENDIUM ch. VIII (1464)), available at http://www.geography.wisc.edu/histcart/
broadsht/brdsht7c.pdf.
74 NICHOLAS
OF CUSA, COMPENDIUM ch. VIII (1464), available at
http://www.geography.wisc.edu/histcart/broadsht/brdsht7.html.
75 Id.
76 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, THE OVER-SOUL (1841), reprinted in SELFRELIANCE AND OTHER ESSAYS 51-64 (Stanley Appelbaum ed., 1993).
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A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its
laws. The territory is the only part which is of certain durability.
“One generation passeth away and another generation cometh, but
the earth abideth forever.” It is of the first importance to duly
consider and estimate this ever-enduring part.77

Such a claim must be evoking/invoking the part of
historical memory that is thought a defining feature of a place; for
Lincoln, a claim of memory must have been implicit, yet the
memory Lincoln invoked was of a duration that commenced with
conquest and then with a compact.78 So the background legal and
mystical phenomenology of nations relies upon a sovereign power
that places a boundary around the claims of place-memory and
clothes that power in moral garments and legal order.79
Dissents from such claims take legal, cultural, and literary
forms in terms of assertions of individual rights, indigenous
rights, guerilla warfare, treaties that give indigenous peoples
partial status as nations within nations, the designation of sacred
places (evoking memory), and subtle analyses of what gives a
person “a human claim” to a place.80 The assertion that settlers

77 Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Second Annual Message
to the Senate and House of Representatives (Dec. 1, 1862), available at
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3737;
ABRAHAM
LINCOLN:
HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 676 (Roy P. Basler ed., Da Capo Press 2001).
78 GEORGE
M. FREDERICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN
INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION 130-50 (Illini Books ed., 1993)
(concerning competing theories of the nation as an organic body or a product of consent
subject to the withdrawal of consent).
79 Perhaps Lincoln’s meaning about time and place can be translated by a
contemporary European thinker:

As legal norms are posited from the first-person plural perspective, they
situate human behaviour in the temporal arc spanning the past, present, and
future of a collective. These modes of time are irreducible to calendar time.
The unity of calendar time manifests itself as the continuum of a before and
an after; by contrast, past, present, and future only appear as a unity to the
extent that the members of a collective mutually engage in action with a view
to realising their common interest: we now “y” to be able to “z” later on, given
that “x” took place. Past, present, and future are sutured into the history of a
“we” through mutual interaction in the framework of a common project.
Because a determinate common interest manifests itself temporally in the
form of a determinate common project, historical time is common in the
twofold sense of a time that is shared by, and distinguishes, the members of a
collective. Precisely for this reason, legal orders unfold a bounded
temporality. In this fundamental sense of the term, the bounded time of a
polity conditions its use of calendar time when setting dates, and in that
sense temporal limits, to human action.
Hans Lindahl, A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries, in GLOBAL
DEMOCRACY AND EXCLUSION 123 (Ronald Tinnevelt & Helder de Schutter eds., 2010).
80 Adam Gopnik, Facing History: Why We Love Camus, NEW YORKER, Apr. 9,
2012, at 70-76.
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have a “human claim” to a place challenges the views of the left
about the moral significance of place as the property—perhaps
even sacred property—of native peoples. Yet, illegal immigrants
to America and other places are in the class the left favors, while
such “settlers” are accused of trying to colonize America. Illegal
immigrants are treated in rhetoric as “invaders,” engaged in
conquest,81 and, by contrast, as persons with a moral right to
mobility.82 For the purposes of immigration by the impoverished,
the right treats immigration in large numbers, if unauthorized, as
a form of invasion of the kind of sovereignty invoked by durationdefined place-memory exemplified in Lincoln’s Second Inaugural.
The left sees such mass movements as the inherent human right to
movement and the shelter of place, and the asylum place can
afford, from menaces made by nature and by sovereign power.83 In
a switch of perspective, the right sees the settling of America as a
heroic story of conquest of the unknown, followed by a manifest
destiny to control territory, and the left sees the founding of
America as steeped in blood, savagery, and theft of land.84
Contemporary doubts and early European debates about
the status of a nation, expressed in the language of
interdisciplinary probing of the theoretical basis for authority,85
Camus felt as deeply for the seeming oppressor as for the oppressed. He
grasped that the great majority of the settlers in any country, and in Algeria
in particular, were as much victims of the circumstances as the locals, and
made the same claims on decency and empathy. They were for the most part
not rootless colonists who had come for the main buck—and those who were
would be replaced by a local boss class. Colonialism is wrong, but the human
claims of the colonists are just as real as those of the colonized. No human
being is more indigenous to a place than any other. This remains an
unfashionable, even taboo, position; one feels it still, for instance, in the
condescension that American leftists offer white South Africans.
Id. at 76.
81 Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act: Blowing Off Steam or Setting Wildfires?, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 296, 336-37 (2009) (describing anti-immigrant sentiment in
Oklahoma and citing stories using the terms “invaders” and “colonize”).
82 See, e.g., Francis A. Gabor, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986: An Analysis in the Light of Contemporary International Law, 23 INT’L LAW. 485,
485-86 (1989) (discussing the fundamental human freedom to “move across national
boundaries”).
83 See McCormick, supra note 81, at 296, 337.
84 For a critical treatment of the versions of the past embraced by writers
who celebrate the settling of areas by an “invading population” that overwhelms,
destroys, and colonizes the indigenous peoples, see DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN
HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD 3-15 (1992).
85 There is a large body of interdisciplinary material subjecting ideas about
sovereignty and territory to skeptical exploration and simple conceptual probing based
upon the growing complications of describing authority as single and comprehensive in
a world that produces law-like norms and systems of governance not tied to territory.
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have counterparts in nineteenth century debates about
nationhood. In Lincoln’s time, there was open contestation of the
claim to a territorial imperative that made the United States a
union that had to be indissoluble. Nathaniel Hawthorne did not
accept the idea of one nation for which blood should be shed to
maintain its territorial form.86 Further, Americans in the
nineteenth century faced confusion about the kind of territorial
claim that could be maintained over a landmass in which the idea
of an organic nation based on tradition and kingly power has been
supplanted by the consent of the governed.87 The consent of the
governed placed individuals acting collectively in charge of their
destiny as part of a nation; how could a government formed in
revolution and with a theory of consent by its inhabitants claim a
right to the loyalty of citizens in a region that no longer wished to
maintain the tie?88
For an intriguing exploration of the increasingly global complexity in sources of legal
mandates, see Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the
21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L. REV.
177, 177 (2012) (asserting that “[g]lobal law can be understood as the systematization
of anarchy, as the management of a loosely intertwined universe of autonomous
governance frameworks operating dynamically across borders and grounded in
functional differentiation among governance communities”).
86 For Hawthorne’s generally disdainful attitude toward the importance of
preserving the Union in its territorial form, see DANIEL AARON, THE UNWRITTEN WAR:
AMERICAN WRITERS AND THE CIVIL WAR 41-55 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1973). Aaron,
seeing through Hawthorne’s eyes, refers to the Union as “that manmade, unnatural
contrivance.” Id. at 42.
87 FREDERICKSON, supra note 78, at 130-50, explores the debate among
adherents of “an essentially liberal” view of the prerogatives of the state, typified by
Francis Lieber; the theorists of a contractual view of the establishment of the Union
typified by John L. O’Sullivan, with the seceding states withdrawing the consent of
“the great mass of population” in those states; and revived conservative views on
loyalism that appealed to a “divine right” view of government, typified by Horace
Bushnell and derived from an “instinct which attaches us to our native country.” Lieber
sought to capture the idea of a difference between a people, which was “merely the
aggregate of the inhabitants of a territory without any additional idea” and a nation,
which “implies a homogenous population, inhabiting a coherent territory; a population
having a common language, literature, institutions, and ‘an organic unity with one
another, as well as being conscious of a common destiny.’” CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 297 (1903) (characterizing and quoting
Lieber). Merriam explains that, though not always clearly expressed, this view became
dominant as an intellectual rationale for the Civil War, with a sense that, despite
American revolutionary origins, “the nation [was] an organic product, the result of an
evolutionary process.” Id. at 297.
88 In M’Culloch v.Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall
contemplated how the mass of individuals who consented to the Constitution related to
place, in a manner that offered an overt theory of the necessity and simultaneous
unimportance of place as critical legal fact:
This mode of proceeding [to adopt the Constitution] was adopted; and by the
Convention, by Congress, and by the State Legislatures, the instrument was
submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which they
can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in
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Nineteenth century thinkers struggled with finding a
rationale for the use of force to prevent a region’s secession from
the constitutional order that claimed a territorial domain.89 The
previous lack of a sense of nationhood became apparent, with the
result that theories about loyalty as a first requirement of
citizenship were developed, and organizations such as the Union
League Club were formed, to articulate and reinforce the idea of
union.90 The narrative of nationhood became unreflective. The
territorial definition of the United States as a nation consisting of
a landmass with subunits that were permanent in political and
geographic form became an unshakeable and unremarked
assumption. The formerly sovereign nations of the native peoples
were subsumed by the territorial sovereignty that permitted
treaties to be adjudged by only one party to the treaty, that is, the
party in control of the entire landmass.91
Today, new visionaries and individualists look for the
Over-soul in the virtual world, in which states, defined and
measured by landmass, lose relative power over small populations
that do not consent to the territorial basis of the laws imposed on
them, where territory is determined by defined portions of the
physical world.92
Place potentially moves more decisively into the
imagination, a collective vision that can take form online in
symbolic form; the place is the collective mind of those who
envision a City liberated from power created by the brute physical
world. The city is occupied by the input of its self-selected
inhabitants, who fill it with the meanings and laws that might
Convention. It is true, they assembled in their several States—and where else
should they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to
think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of
compounding the American people into one common mass. Of consequence,
when they act, they act in their States. But the measures they adopt do not,
on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become
the measures of the State governments.
Id. (emphasis added).
89 See FREDERICKSON, supra note 78, at 76-77 (contrasting Bushnell’s
conservative views critical of the Declaration of Independence as a wrong democratic
principle conducive to the Civil War with Wendell Phillips’s fears that the war was
justifying anti-democratic, authoritarian impulses).
90 See FREDERICKSON, supra note 78, at 131.
91 See Osofsky, supra note 35, at 129 (explaining that a Western Soshone
family whose lands are being expropriated by the United States “are trapped inside a
legal system in which the expropriator evaluates and validates its own expropriation
with minimal responsiveness to external condemnation of its behavior”). Osofsky refers
to the rejection by the United States of international treaty-based interventions as a
claim to control a “distinct sociolegal space.” Id. at 149.
92 See SCHMIDT & COHEN, supra note 58, at 101.
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govern a secessionist physical location. A virtual world claims a
place as an alternative to physical place, inhabited by emigrants
from the literalism of authority based on physical proximity, and,
today, by claimed sovereignty over bounded territory, to the
voluntarism of a chosen citizenship in a nation assembled within
the virtual reality lodged in the Cloud. The visual and sensory
connection to the world suggested by Cusa’s metaphor of the
human being as a city with gates has been93 and will be
increasingly undercut by technology that separates human
beings from un-chosen sensory input and allows them to create
a sensory environment from the virtual world, or from
avocations that supplant the need to observe one’s
surroundings. In the twentieth century, skyscrapers severed
their occupants from contact with nature or street life and
placed them in controlled environments that had little that was
supplied by the spontaneous and random events of an urban
place. It was a cliché of twentieth century writing that the
occupants of such towers lost contact, in their work life or their
transportation from work to home, with poverty or urban
chaos. They used superhighways or trains to go from a tower to
a suburb, which was designed to give controlled contact with
nature and refuge from contact with different classes.94 Yet the
city of collective perception can be reconstructed in an
imagined place, a factor that keeps the metaphor of place a
strong presence in conceptions of shared experience.95
B.

Place in Motion

The car has simultaneously connected drivers to the
physical world and created means of escape from place as
primary.96 The inside of a car is a place that can influence or even
define one’s identity. “Automobility” has helped Americans to
equate the idea of freedom with mobility, or, more pungently, to
See NICHOLAS OF CUSA, supra note 74.
A review of the comic treatment of New York City in the 1980s in TOM
WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987) captures the sense of insulation purchased in
the city. Frank Conroy, Urban Rats in Fashion’s Maze, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1987), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/wolfe-bonfire.html (reviewing Bonfire
and summing up the main character, an investment banker who “lives in the middle of
New York City without knowing New York City”).
95 See
infra notes 116-36 and accompanying text (discussing place
conceptions relating to abortion regulations).
96 For a darker view of the cultural significance of cars, see Carol Sanger,
Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 705, 711 (1995) (suggesting that a woman’s sharing of space in a car with a
man is viewed as automatically consenting to sex).
93
94
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“assert[ ] motion to be the epitome, and not simply one possible
dimension, of freedom.”97 Ambiguities about the evolution and
cultural meanings of place converge with the car. Cars connect
people to place but also sever them from place because they are
always moving.98 But cars are becoming more self-contained, and
as the trend toward driverless cars continues, cars are more and
more their own place. The car is a microcosm of a transformation
of place, complete with legal and cultural consequences.99
For automobility, or the experience of freedom understood
as autonomous motion, the next phase in automobile technology
and user behavior will render the body passive while in motion
and in private transportation. The process of simultaneously
escaping place and choosing and seeing place will become distant
from the human subject. Driverless cars will carry human

97 COTTEN SEILER, REPUBLIC OF DRIVERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AUTOMOBILITY IN AMERICA 149 (2008).
98 In one passage, CRESSWELL, supra note 16, at 7 says that a place is a
space, or location, “which people have madel . . . a meaningful location.” The
relationship of the car to much of “space” is highly impersonal and transient.
Superhighways long ago severed car travel from a strong connection to place, even
disrupting local understandings of a meaningful location. Railroads have had similar
effects on a large scale. Richard White has argued that a premature development of
railroads reconfigured space, created a hitherto unimagined “spatial politics,” and gave
motion pride of place over the senses that dwell on the local. “The railroads made space
political by making the quotidian experience of place one of rapid movement. A railroad
train in motion was a snorting, smoking, roaring thing; for all the beauty of its movement, it
was an assault on the human senses, which registered that it was the train’s movement
that mattered.” RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN AMERICA 141 (2011).
99 For a striking evocation, by contrast, of the impact of modern forms of
travel in both exploring space and concealing the texture of places, see GRAHAM ROBB,
THE DISCOVERY OF FRANCE: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
FIRST WORLD WAR (2007). As a purported expert on France, Robb discovered “the
uncharted interior” that is another, undiscovered and incompletely mapped France
compared with the image of France “pieced together” in political transitions and from a
perspective dominated by images of Paris and “a few powerful individuals.” Id. at xvxvii. The means of his discovery, and then historical exploration of, a terra incognita of
France was the bicycle. Traveling by bicycle, Robb discovered a France that maps have
not been capable of capturing—“the more accurate the map, the more misleading the
impression.” Id. at 6.

A bicycle unrolls a 360-degree panorama of the land, allows the rider to
register its gradual changes in gear ratios and muscle tension, and makes it
hard to miss a single inch of it . . . . The itinerary of a cyclist recreates, as if
by chance, much older journeys: transhumance trails, Gallo-Roman trade
routes, pilgrim paths, river confluences that have disappeared in industrial
wasteland, valleys and ridge roads that used to be busy with pedlars and
migrants. Cycling also makes conversation easy and inevitable—with
children, nomads, people who are lost, local amateur historians and, of
course, dogs . . . .
Id. at xvi.
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subjects100 immersed in the virtual world at their fingertips and
confined to a space that lacks sufficient sensory input to assert
the claims of a proximate physical place over subjectivity or
one’s experience of physical vulnerability.101
In addition, unanticipated effects will reorder features
of public policy, such as revenue sources for cities.102 In such
horseless and driverless carriages, the brute fact of place as a
source of legal obligation, self-definition, or limitation will fade.
The legal ramifications of design that relieve human actors of the
risks attendant on personal agency in physical place will
gradually emerge from policy making and legal reasoning, as
fewer unguided autonomous actions are necessary to accomplish
basic tasks.103 As suggested by analysts of system architecture,
some forms of legal regulation and retrospective accountability
can recede as forms of choice disappear from the transparent
and undesigned physical world.104
Thus, an attempt to organize a Restatement of law
around place is both a rich entry point into law and elusive to
capture as a legal topic. Unlike the study of special collections of
standard subsets of law, such as sports law or construction law,
the law of place is not a set of standard doctrines affecting an
activity. Rather, place is the unstated premise of much of law.
Places organize the operative parts of a legal question; locutions
take forms of place metaphor or they overtly use measurements of
space to define duties and rights, and find facts of legal import.
Courts now take judicial notice of Google maps as a basis for a

100 Nick Bilton, Disruptions: How Driverless Cars Could Reshape Cities, N.Y.
TIMES (July 7, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/disruptions-how-driverlesscars-could-reshape-cities/ (“I could sleep in my driverless car, or have an exercise bike in
the back of the car to work out on the way to work.” (quoting Bryant Walker Smith, a
fellow at the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School and a member of
the Center for Automotive Research at Stanford)).
101 See Paul Stenquist, Nissan Announces Plan to Release Driverless Cars by 2020,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/nissan-announcesplans-to-release-driverless-cars-by-2020/ (noting the questions of driver loss of skills and
apportionment of liability between manufacturers and “vehicle occupants”).
102 Nick Bilton, The Money Side of Driverless Cars, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013, 1:36
PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/the-end-of-parking-tickets-drivers-and-carinsurance/; see also Assemb. B. 511, 2011 Leg., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/76th2011/Bills/AB/AB511_EN.pdf (defining autonomous
vehicles and providing for their regulation).
103 “Neither human error nor human nature will interfere with your gratingly
perfect morning.” Janet Maslin, Formatting a World with No Secrets: ‘The New Digital
Age,’ by Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, at C31, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/books/the-new-digital-age-by-eric-schmidt-andjared-cohen.html.
104 See Tien, supra note 55, at 5-7.
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fact finding about distances.105 Law assumes how a human subject
operates, and in turn assumes there is a formative influence that
gives comprehensibility to the subject on which the law imposes
its commands. Place is the always-lurking formative influence,
arraying critical meanings around the legal subject.
V.

RESTATING PLACE: CONSIDERING POSSIBILITIES

Evolving understandings of place are a source of
orientation to the features of the world that organize perceptions.
These evolving understandings, as well as abstract meanings of
place in dimensions of personal definition, underlie moral
domains and suggest that place can be an organizing topic for a
Restatement. This Restatement would serve to both capture
features of existing law and propose avenues for law reform and
adaptation. The question to explore, then, is the utility of
undertaking such a compilation. Is place too abstract a concept
to merit special attention to its range, its place in law, and its
applications? Does a compilation reveal a larger theme about
place that calls for systematic examination, analytic challenge,
and reconfiguring the assumptions on which law rests
concerning the physical configuration of the world and its
metaphorical extensions into claims of legal force? How might
it be organized?106
The rules that demand measurement of distances and the
doctrines that configure persona, and the tropes that conjure a
location for a legally relevant act or regulation (the public square,
the marketplace, standing one’s “ground”), draw upon
unelaborated uses of ideas about real proximity and ideas about
See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1008 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012).
LAW AND GEOGRAPHY (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003). LAW
AND GEOGRAPHY contains the following parts (aside from introduction): Boundaries;
Land; Property; Nature; Identity, People, Persons, and Places; Culture and Time;
Knowledge. In Spatial Dimensions of Private Law, contributors Nick Jackson and John
Wightman attempt to narrow the scope of the factor in law of space by excluding “rights . . .
[that] are defined in a wholly spatial way,” such as, in their view, “chattels, the personal
rights to bodily integrity in the tort of negligence and the intentional torts, and intellectual
property rights.” Id. at 35. Given the fluid meanings of space and place, and their
metaphoric character in the cultural and legal imagination, such an exclusion is not
manageable for reducing the scope and abstractness of the whole topic. Jackson and
Wightman seek to identify and “explore the spatial dimensions of private law which are
detectable in the law itself . . . .” Id. For this article, the suggestion is that some topics
that might be restated present themselves overtly as about little but a place: the law of
garages, rules about minimum space in a prison cell, property lines, zoning, and so
forth. Those are the parts of a restatement of place that are the most straightforward
for compilation from existing treatises, but not the defining limit of the law to be
understood and analyzed.
105
106
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aspects of the world that require a conception of place as the
forum in which acts occur and may be assigned significance.
A.

Legal Subject Status: Who Are We?

At a macro-level, territory imposes identities on the
occupants that vary according to the assertion by some claimant
over the landmass to possession of legal authority. Benton
describes the effects of colonization by conquest on the
development of an order that does not depend on the creation and
enforcement of a uniform law,107 but which has the capacity to redefine the identity of the inhabitants of the landmass108 and to
lead some of them to become bureaucratic mediators between the
law of the claimant and the local customs in specific locales.109
1. Mapping Moral Inches
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court sought to
determine whether a form of abortion that requires the exit of a
fetal head from the birth canal before surgical destruction of
the fetus could be banned, though destruction of the same fetus
would be legal if done before the fetus had emerged from the
birth canal.110 Issues included an “undue burden” on pregnant
persons for whom the contested form might be a preferred
alternative for preserving child-bearing capacity, and adequate
notice to a physician regarding the criminal prohibition of the
legally disfavored method. In his opinion, borrowing a term from
anatomy designed to trace the common ancestry of organisms in
different species, Justice Kennedy analogized the female body to
mapped terrain.111 “Marks” on a map define the prohibited and
the permitted on the basis of physical enclosure; one may commit
an act legally within the bounded space but not inches outside
that space. “Anatomical landmarks” read into the interior of an
abstracted body, a body existing in a judicial text with an
evocation of geography absent from physical embodiment, a
meaning about activity within and outside the boundaries of a
place. The interior of a female body is given legal meaning as a
place, within which acts may be legal though mediated by legal
BENTON, supra note 39, at 9.
Id. at 14-15.
109 See generally id.
110 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
111 Id. at 147 (holding that the ban is not void for vagueness and does not
impose an undue burden).
107
108
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regulation and without which the same act is homicide. The
difference in inches is given heavy moral significance to justify the
altered legal definition112 of an act otherwise the same except for a
small difference in the place it occurs.113 Yet the difference
appears to rise to the level of a demarcation of state jurisdiction; if
a fetus is destroyed within a female’s body, neither the state nor
the citizenry has “seen” the act, and thus the state has a weaker
claim to jurisdiction.114 Further, the mapping of the female body,
using “anatomical landmarks,” provides adequate notice to a
physician of the territory of the state’s jurisdiction; the physician
may plan an excursion within a bounded space with sufficient
precision to remain securely inside the boundaries of a less
regulated domain. Yet the female body produces ambiguities that
make mapping legal boundaries uncertain, as it once made a
medieval treatise, On the Secrets of Women (De Secretis
Mulierum), problematic for the form of discourse in the Middle
Ages about secrecy and monsters.115
The terminology of anatomical landmarks, though used
as a claim about “due process” for physicians and thus about
“undue burden” for pregnant persons, nonetheless echoes a
conception of the mind as a city116 with gates through which the
senses enter.117 The visibility and entrance into the mind’s gate of
a fetus by its passing an anatomical landmark defined by the
boundary of the female body render the circumstance of an
aborted birth a legal moment different from the less fraught legal
moment that might occur fractions of an inch earlier in the
interior of the female body. Place supports the mapping of moral
inches, with the severest legal consequence driven by moral
condemnation arising from the passage, through the gate, and
into the senses. Indeed, Justice Kennedy is keen to protect the
physician from the reputational effects118 of doing an act that can
be imagined as being in a quasi-public space that most of the
alarmed “observers” would never enter for direct observation or
Id. at 141.
Id. at 139, 147-48.
114 Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.
914, 930 (2000)) Comparing the disallowed procedure from the permitted one, Justice
Ginsburg writes, “The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only
a method of performing abortion.”
115 SARAH ALISON MILLER, MEDIEVAL MONSTROSITY AND THE FEMALE BODY 56
(2010) (“Although the disclosure of women’s secrets depends on the legibility of the
female body, the instability of its corporeal borders and the ambiguity of its
superfluities trouble the text’s claim over this semantic field.”).
116 See NICHOLAS OF CUSA, supra note 74.
117 See supra Part IV.
118 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157.
112
113
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even witness by remote visual means. Thus, place assumes a role
as a public space by virtue of the hypothetical witnessing of an
act not hidden within the physical female’s bodily domain.
The glimpse afforded by a citizen’s imaginary viewing of
an event in an exterior space becomes legally dispositive.
Presumably, even if the physician allowed no other direct witness
of the act, and used techniques that obscured his own glimpse of
the critical legal moment, as it is obscured by abortions completed
within the now-zoned space of the body, the space outside the
body demarked by an anatomical landmark would be imagined as
one in which events occurring in it are visually disturbing and
hence an odious presence in the “city” of the legal and layman’s
mind. For the fraught moment mapped by Justice Kennedy’s
exploration of the female body, the interior of the female body is
left as an unobserved “non-space.” Recent shifts in legal
regulation have sought to reclaim that space for the “city.”119
In the concluding part of the article, I will propose a
concrete approach to a statement of principles to guide law-making
in the context of regulating reproduction. My approach will address
place as the primary subject of such regulations in the broader
context of the provision of medical services to a patient.
2. More Moral Inches
Recent efforts at opening a new space within the female
body that is observable within the city have occurred with the
enactment of mandatory sonogram laws that require pregnant
women to view a sonogram of a fetus before an abortion can be
provided. Such a law seeks to relocate the concealed space of
the female body into a public zone of possible observation, and
render it potentially disturbing to the compelled viewer and to
the constructed imagined gaze of the citizenry on both the
compelled viewer and the contents of the female interior. The
female interior becomes a new site of exploration, depiction,
narrative, and claims of sovereignty by means of discovery and
report. Technology allows the reclaiming of the territory as
interior, as by the use of a morning-after pill or a pill that
induces a medical abortion. In the most aggressive reclaiming
of place as concealed and private, some women order the pill
online for mailing to their homes.120
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
Dawn Stacey, Women Are Buying Home Abortion Pills Online . . . ,
ABOUT.COM (Dec. 3, 2009), http://contraception.about.com/b/2009/12/03/women-arebuying-home-abortion-pills-online.htm.
119
120
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The respect for privacy in a home is a factor in the
cultural willingness to evade restrictive laws by initiating a
medical abortion in their homes.121 But the home is not a fully
private site for women who abort; there is no protective doctrine
allowing termination of a pregnancy in the privacy of the home
comparable to the constitutional doctrine that protects the
possession of pornography in the home.122 Yet, in the past, the
practice of abortion was heavily private. Abortion discussions
substantially occurred in private spheres such as the home or a
medical office and recognition was common that women grounded
their claim to a need in a direct, unmediated experience of their
own bodies.123 In a self-protective maneuver, however, the
medical profession in the twentieth century began to report
cases of women who sought help for infections brought about by
home or underground abortions.124
Today, place has been reconfigured to allow for (1)
discursive mapping of the female body by judicial mandarins for
the gaze of readers, (2) opening the interior of the female body as
a public venue for enforced viewing by individual women and an
imagined collective, and, finally, (3) some recovery of privacy of
and autonomy over the female body, through the availability of
pills that induce medical abortions.125 The female body is, in the
modern-day equivalent of medieval texts, a site of “semantic
indeterminacy”126 for which solutions are sought based on
conceptions of place—”anatomical landmarks,” enforced
121 Id. To warn that the home use of the pill can create a risk of an incomplete
abortion and possible infection, women explain to other women that seeking medical
attention for a miscarriage should be routine and reliable.
122 For a treatment of the exposure of pregnant women to criminal sanctions,
including a case arising from a spontaneous abortion or miscarriage in the privacy of a
home, and restraint of physical liberty to relocate a pregnant woman to a place in
which she lacks all privacy, including a right of bodily integrity, see Lynn M. Paltrow &
Jeanne Flavin, The Policy and Politics of Reproductive Health: Arrests of and Forced
Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for
Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 308 (2013);
see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (constitutional protection for
possession of obscenity in the home, though the material was legally obscene under
state law).
123 LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE AND LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973 at 8 (1997) (explaining that “the popular ethic regarding
abortion and common law were grounded in the female experience of their own bodies”).
124 Id. at 60, 120 (explaining how the American Medical Association began to
recommend that women seeking abortions be handed over by physicians to the police
and how physicians were pressured to report and obtain evidence from women patients
suffering from a badly done abortion).
125 Place in the nineteenth century provided ample opportunity for privacy by
women seeking to avoid a pregnancy before quickening. REAGAN, supra note 123, at 9
(describing herbs used by women to create an abortion).
126 MILLER, supra note 115, at 71.
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sonograms to make the female interior readable by a pregnant
woman who becomes the primary participant in a shared viewing,
and, most directly and literally, the alteration of the physical
enclosures in which an activity protected as “private” can occur.
The alteration is meant to render the exercise of a right of
privacy less secluded and to expose the “patient” in need of
regulated service by placing her in a space that is designed127 to
prevent seclusion.128 Laws enacted by legislators with male
majorities, such as The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996,129 constitute a re-shaping of place—
not merely that of the female body as a private interior, as
assumed and implicitly conceded by Justice Kennedy, but of
the places for the rendering of service to the anatomic
female130—and an interpreting of a body through the gate of
shared, legally privileged perceptions that situate observation,
disapproval, and regulatory scope.
In this conception of place, the female body is made a
part of a “semantic field” that a “text” would claim131 a “placecentered” text of a kind for which the male body lacks a
counterpart. This use of place as an unreflective intuition is a
127 Tien, supra note 55. Tien explains that much design that asserts control over
conduct is concealed and hence a means of enforcing legally relevant preferences through
design. The effort to “redesign” the available spaces for legal abortion is not hidden, but, should
the effort succeed, the capacity of architecture to reshape cultural possibilities would gain force,
as the locations in which women may exercise their right of “privacy” become state
architecture, monitored and controlled. The outcome may well be shaped by culturally vigorous
counter-conceptions of “women’s” space and the malleability of place—internet communication,
mobility, subterranean markets, self-help in places shielded from the domain of a claimed
public place—as well as by political mobilization to restore a law of women’s place for control of
their reproductive capacity. The idea of place is potentially a useful rubric for countermobilization under the banner of the home, and extensions of a home atmosphere, as a private
place for control of the sexed body. The feminist concern with “safe spaces” is a natural
rhetorical response, built around place as a legally relevant construct, to the movement toward
legal re-imagining of place to remap the female body for regulation of female reproduction.
128 For example, Idaho enacted a set of statutory criminal prohibitions forbidding
“any person,” read by a prosecutor to apply to self-abortion, to perform an abortion without
strict adherence to regulations designed for physicians. Idaho Code section 18-606, directly
applicable to pregnant women, subjected “[e]very woman who knowingly submits to an
abortion or solicits of another, for herself, the production of an abortion, or who purposely
terminates her own pregnancy otherwise than by a live birth” to felony charges. IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-606 (2013). The exception was if the abortion were performed as permitted
by the remainder of title 8, chapter 6 of the Idaho code, including Idaho Code section 18-615.
Id. § 18-615; see McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012) (sustaining
preliminary injunction against enforcement of Code Section 18-606). The abortion services
that McCormack had sought, for reduction of cost, were medications prescribed over the
internet. Id. at 1008.
129 HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42
U.S.C. (2012)).
130 See supra note 128.
131 See MILLER, supra note 115, at 56.
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problematic presence in law, insofar as law is meant to be rational
and consistent in its claims to jurisdiction and authority and, by
the element of rationality and consistency of law, capable of
bearing a moral weight proportionate to the coercion the law
brings to bear on human conduct. Thus, the places made critical
for the female body shift over time. The home has been capable of
conferring anonymity and autonomy over reproduction (though
often analyzed as a place of female imprisonment, domination,
and domestication).132 The interior of the female body has allowed
concealment from a demarcation of a private space.
In response to the availability of legal abortion outside
the privacy of the home through female collective efforts to gain
access to low-cost medical services, private/public space in
hospitals and clinics responsive to pregnant women’s needs
have become the next place subject to attempts at control over
female autonomy and privacy. Onerous regulations on the
dimensions of hallways and the availability of expensive equipment
relocate abortion services to full service hospitals, many of which do
not in fact generally offer abortion. Laws regulating abortion clinics
out of existence through micro-management of place are now being
enhanced to limit entry by doctors into places left intact for service
to women’s reproductive health. New legislation in Texas is
expected to reduce the number of clinics offering abortion from a
few dozen to approximately five.133
Control over place is being further asserted by laws
forbidding the ingestion of an abortion pill outside the presence
of a physician.134 The conventional rhetoric criticizes such a law
as interfering with the relationship between a woman and her
physician, but of more significance is the effort to erase places in
which women can claim autonomy once available to them through
132 The home is heavily associated with marital privacy, which has been critiqued
as a danger to women. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV.
973, 975 (1991) (asserting that, “The notion of marital privacy has been a source of
oppression to battered women and has helped to maintain women’s subordination within
the family”); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-94 (1992)
(enumerating statistics on the prevalence of domestic violence and the danger to a pregnant
woman of notifying her husband of her intent to have an abortion).
133 Anna M. Tinsley, Restrictive Law Could Force Most Texas Abortion Clinics
to Close, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (July 6, 2013), http://www.star-telegram.com/
2013/07/06/4985451/restrictive-law-could-force-most.html.
134 Tara Culp-Ressler, Five States Working to Limit Women’s Access to the
Abortion Pill, THINKPROGRESS (May 14, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/
2013/05/14/2007751/five-states-restrictions-abortion-pill/. A Louisiana law, enacted in June
2013, provides that doctors qualified in obstetrics or gynecology must be in the same room
and in the physical presence of the pregnant woman when the drug or chemical inducing an
abortion is initially administered. A doctor who violates the new rule could be fined
$1,000, imprisoned for two years, or both”). La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 40:1299.35.2.1 (2013).
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the politely legal practice of abortion by physicians in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century and the long tradition of
self-help in the home by women consulting one another.135 Thus,
recent trends in the legal assertion of jurisdiction over and the
legal mapping of both the female interior and permissible
locations of the female body for the receipt of reproductive
services expand the place within the body subject to regulation—
sonograms and monitoring—and reduce the space available to
female embodiment for receipt of services.
The disappearance of place as a physical presence that
enables regulation is being countermanded by a legal attempt to
restore and expand place as a factor in control over the female
body. Such a trend is seemingly counter to other trends that the
malleability of place empowers, allowing for a reduction of
regulation that relies on literal place. Efforts in law to restore
place as a decisive factor for the fate of women who have
reproductive capacity betray an anxiety associated with the
fluidity of place and the consequent autonomy that the waning
hold of place over some human hazards produces. Indeed, with the
movement toward enforced sonograms, the reconceptualization of a
hidden place as public confronts and refutes the mapping logic used
by Justice Kennedy to distinguish protected medical procedures
from procedures that can be criminally punished.136 If Justice
Kennedy is a geographer of the female body, legislators are the
master map makers whose cartography of the female persona
would, if allowed to stand, render his mapping as obsolete as any
fading atlas forgotten on a bottom shelf in a neglected room of
dusty volumes.
3. Mapping More Than Inches
For jurisdiction based on territorial logic, moral inches
expand to feet, yards, and “rods” in certain criminal buffer
statutes that permit forum shopping by prosecutors.137 In this
example, place is allowed to be fluid, with prosecutors allowed
to treat space as trivial for qualifying a locale in which to
135 REAGAN, supra note 123, at 28 (describing mothers’ determination to help
daughters, with occasional collusion to hide an abortion from the father).
136 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
137 Brian C. Kalt, Crossing Eight Mile: Juries of the Vicinage and County-Line
Criminal Buffer Statutes, 80 WASH. L. REV. 271, 279 (2005) (“The width of the buffer
zones established by these statutes ranges from 100 feet (in Louisiana) to a mile (in
Arizona, Michigan, and Oregon); the median and most common distance is 1500 feet.
Befitting the anachronistic nature of the statutes, some define the buffer width in rods,
an archaic measure equal to 5 1/2 yards.”).
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prosecute a defendant. A boundary loses its magic as a source
of sensory input; an act that could not be visible to any person
in the prosecuting jurisdiction138 is nonetheless sufficiently
relevant to the sensibilities of the “vicinage”139 that will assess
legal blame to allow its juries to impose legal liability for an act
well outside its point of entry and in the interior of another legal
space. Brian Kalt argues that the difference matters because the
juries in counties next to a county where a crime occurred may well
have different local sensibilities.140 Different counties receive
different sensory input, in part from their demographic
composition, so that the “minds” of the neighboring geographic
areas may not be the same. Kalt argues that the difference in the
“minds” is of sufficient moral weight to support legal protections for
anyone accused of a crime in a buffer zone outside a neighboring
county in which the state criminal buffer zone permits prosecution.
Might a theory of place as a legal factor reduce the need for cosmic
gambles created by line-drawing for which little rationale, except a
shrug of the shoulder, can be offered?
At the same time, a matter of 227 feet141 can bear the
moral weight to determine whether a crime can be punished by
death. The jurisdiction of the federal government over crimes
in national forests is general and includes murder.142 In a case
involving a murder in which the victim’s body was found in a lake
in a national forest in Michigan, the court ruled, at the request of
the parties, on subject matter jurisdiction issues, including issues
of whether the United States had accepted jurisdiction over the
forest when it accepted its transfer from Michigan and whether
murder in national forests has been made criminal by the federal
code.143 The defendant additionally argued basic constitutional
infirmities in the “patchwork” or “checkerboard” nature of the
existence of federal criminal jurisdiction in the Manistee National
Forest, including due process (notice), equal protection (arbitrary
138 Brian Kalt notes that jurisdiction and venue are sometimes used
interchangeably in cases or statutes, so here there is no fine distinction. Id. at 276.
139 Id. at 276.
140 Id. at 321.
141 United States v. Gabrion, 648 F.3d 307, 316-17 (6th Cir. 2011) (“His
counsel wanted to offer in mitigation and argue to the jury that in our legal system
Gabrion’s trial would have had to take place in state court where life imprisonment
was the maximum punishment, instead of in the federal court, if the victim’s body had
been found outside the Manistee National Forest, just 227 feet away from where it was
found inside the National Forest. His counsel wanted the jury to choose life
imprisonment, rather than the death penalty, because the State of Michigan had
abolished the death penalty and had not executed anyone for more than 160 years.”).
142 United States v. Gabrion, 517 F.3d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 2008).
143 See id. at 839-44 .
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and irrational scheme of geographical categorization of
jurisdiction), and the Eighth Amendment (concerns in Furman v.
Georgia about arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty).144 For
equal protection, the Supreme Court had already reversed a
Ninth Circuit holding that “geographic and thematic”
checkerboard jurisdiction in Indian country “lacked a rational basis
and violated the Equal Protection Clause.”145 The Sixth Circuit
quotes the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the lines the Ninth
Circuit thought irrational are standard for the place called Indian
Country: “The lines the State has drawn may well be difficult to
administer. But they are no more or less so than many of the
classifications that pervade the law of Indian jurisdiction.”146
In a concurrence, Sixth Circuit Judge Moore addressed
the due process arguments in an earnest effort to rationalize
the moral weight of minute mapping of territorial jurisdiction:
[T]he fact that the federal government has criminal jurisdiction over
some but not all of the parcels in the Manistee National Forest and
that these are arrayed in a patchwork fashion does not mean
Gabrion had no notice that death might be the potential penalty for
first-degree murder within Manistee. Even if the federal government
had criminal jurisdiction over the entirety of the Manistee National
Forest, at some seemingly arbitrary geographic point a person would
cross over from the area of Michigan’s criminal jurisdiction to the
area of concurrent federal jurisdiction. If that person committed
first-degree murder on one side of the line, he could not receive the
death penalty; if the same person committed first-degree murder on
the other side of the line, he might receive the death penalty. The
jurisdictional consequences of committing first-degree murder within
or outside of the Oxford Lake parcel is in no significant respect more
arbitrary than the jurisdictional consequences of the same act were
there no patchwork jurisdiction within the Manistee National
Forest. In conclusion, I do not think the patchwork jurisdiction in the
Manistee National Forest violates Gabrion’s right to due process or
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.147

For due process and the vagaries of geography, Judge
Moore echoed the Supreme Court’s so it goes view about the
patchwork woven into territorial logic, with the fillip of a tie to
place-derived forms of ethnic identity.148 Indeed, to buttress her
argument that one arbitrary effect of geography is not worse than
Id. at 867 (Moore, J., concurring).
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463 (1979); Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington,
552 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1977).
146 Gabrion, 517 F.3d at 868 (Moore, J. concurring) (citing Confederated Bands
& Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 502).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 866-69.
144
145
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another, Judge Moore took refuge in a rule that Professor Peter
Smith has classified as “a new legal fiction,” meaning any
instance “when (1) the court offers an ostensibly factual
supposition as a ground for creating a legal rule or modifying, or
refusing to modify, an existing legal rule; and (2) the factual
supposition is descriptively inaccurate.”149 Specifically, Judge
Moore cited authority on ignorance of the law: “The general rule
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to
criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal
system.”150 As Smith notes, the saying, “ignorance of the law is no
excuse,” is the extent of the law that most people know.151 Thus,
the mysteries of small differences in the geographical moment of
a concealed act of brutality, made to determine large
differences in the penalty for a near madman,152 are brought to
rest upon a legal fiction with little application to the average
man and surely none to a brutish killer with a post-crime
interest in the boundaries of a national forest.
The need for a legal fiction to establish the moral
defensibility of patchwork jurisdiction is no surprise. Justice
Brennan wrote of “painful conversations,” when a lawyer must
tell a client that the race of his victim in Georgia provides a
strong indication of the probability of his receiving the death
penalty upon conviction.153 Perhaps a killer’s learning that his
exposure to capital punishment depends upon the morally
insignificant happenstance of an uncertain few feet one way or
the other in a national forest is less painful. It is bad luck of a
cosmic size to have been on the wrong side of an arbitrary
jurisdictional line in a poorly mapped and empty forest, but the
lawyer can tell the client that line-drawing is always necessary in
law. Here, the doctrine of place confesses the limits of moral
reasoning in law, confronts and accepts the arbitrary nature of
some lines, and asks those to whom the line points to death to
appreciate the inevitable roll of the jurisdictional dice.

Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1441 (2010).
Gabrion, 517 F.3d. at 869 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)).
151 Smith, supra note 149, at 1459 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 405 (1978)); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 645-46 (1984)
(“If one were to take a poll and ask about the legal significance of ignorance of law,
most nonlawyers would answer, I believe, by citing the maxim that ‘ignorance of the
law is no excuse.’”).
152 Gabrion, 517 F.3d at 869.
153 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 345 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149
150
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Moral inches may seem like the framework of a mystic or
medieval theologian, or of a strangely high-minded pettifogger, or
the ending point for the capacity of logic to supply fit distinctions.
But Justice Kennedy was not really reasoning about the moral
significance of place on a general level, and neither are the
justices and judges who agree that one instance of using small
measures of space for large legal effects is no more
unconstitutional than another. Extending his relaxed approach to
place as a metric of birth and criminal penalty, Justice Kennedy
also relied upon place, i.e., the location of a fetus in a female body,
to create an identity—that of mother—and even to ascribe to the
woman, imagined as containing a mystical “place,” with
generative powers, the act of creating life.154
Perhaps it is for the Restatement of Place to find the inner
logic of laws that measure law’s domain and attendant personal
accountability and standards of conduct by rulers, or yardsticks,
or the surveyors’ instruments for mapping rough terrain.
B.

Nonplace

Some parts of the world, which is to say some places,
are not places. They do nothing that place ordinarily does. They
do not confer or intensify identity as might a gay bar in the
1990s or a private club in the 1880s; they empty the occupant
of identity, plunging the person into a zone of distance from
any but a core self in an anonymous world.155 By contrast, some
geographic sorting creates enclaves of intensified identity.156
“Nonplaces” are deserts of human connection, despite the
presence of human beings. A nonplace makes strangers among
strangers. Unlike a place, in which a stranger may begin to
assert personal meanings through encounters amenable to
reconstructing identity through personal exchange, query and
Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 151-55 (2007).
For an extreme contrast, a person can have an identity attach in one discursive
space and then be imposed on her in another discursive space. I have suggested gay bars as
an example. Once a person enters a bar of the sort that, at least until recently, was a
gathering spot for gay people to reveal by their presence in the bar their possible availability
for gay social life, an identity attached over which the person lacked control in a different
discursive environment. Marc Poirer explores the attempt by the Boy Scout, James Dale, to
separate the discursive environments of his college campus, where he was openly gay and
activist, and his local Boy Scout troop, in which he sought to retain, unaffected by his
presence in another discursive space, an unmodified identity as a Boy Scout. Poirier
analyzes the means by which the law read his presence in one discursive location as
attaching permanently to his body. See Poirier, Discursive Space, supra note 19, at 315. The
term I offer for this phenomenon is identity-forming/intensifying place.
156 See Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 955 (2012).
154
155
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displays of need, the nonplace offers no hope of socially
constructed comprehensibility supplied by residents with
memories and “ownership.” The following description captures
the texture of a nonplace:
[A] “nonplace” [is] “a space which cannot be defined as relational, or
historical, or concerned with identity”; defined by what it lacks, a nonplace
effects a certain detachment between it and the people traversing it.
Nonplaces, such as freeways, airports, supermarkets, and even ATMs—
all planned, sterile, and transient—are not conducive to the expression of
collective contractual obligations based on shared values and beliefs, [sic]
such obligations would be better expressed for example in nonplanned
neighborhoods with a history. Haifa’s Central Bus Station lacked any
such historical contexts; the six-lane highway, the concrete buildings, and
the harsh, angular shape of the station itself were alienating (not to
mention plain ugly). The area was designed to be passed through, not to
encourage people to linger around nor to convey (or to be receptive to)
messages based on “collective contractual obligations.”157

Law’s function in a nonplace is minimal. Laws against
crime are in effect, though many nonplaces may be less defensible
than places. Random crimes with no motive and no witness were
once very difficult to detect. Today, ubiquitous video cameras158
can capture the moment of a crime and provide leads to
apprehend criminals who take advantage of a nonplace to inflict
harm or exploit others. But nonplaces are not defined by any law
that mandates such precautions. The territory for a nonplace to
exist is limitless, and only dense, commonly used nonplaces are
likely to have video monitoring. Roadside memorials occupy small
nonplaces that are created by the serendipity of tragedy that
brings survivors to mark the nonplace as place with memory. But
157 Sharon Halevi & Orna Blumen, What a Difference a Place Makes: The
Reflexive (Mis)management of a City’s Pasts, 37 J. URB. HIST. 384, 389 (2011).
158 See Adam Schwartz, Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive
and Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 47, 47
(2013). Schwartz notes with, some concern for privacy, civil liberties, and a paucity of
regulation, that “[t]hese cameras have powers that greatly exceed ordinary powers of
human observation, including automatic tracking of cars, and magnification of small
objects at great distances.” Id. at 48. Schwartz further describes Chicago’s system of
video surveillance: “Chicago’s system of video surveillance cameras has three critical
features: their vast numbers, their tight integration, and their powerful abilities to
gather and analyze information. Together, these features empower City government to
monitor anyone automatically, quickly, easily, inexpensively, and surreptitiously, in all
public places and at all times.” Id. The attempt to provide the capacities of human
presence to places where direct observation may not occur has the effect of altering the
limitations of human perception and transforming the texture of situated life, with its
omissions of observation on which place-bound humanity has long relied for the
unimportance of some ephemeral moments. The loss of ephemera, meaning the
preservation of moments otherwise fleeting in human memory and lost to history, as a
feature of living implicates legal rules, which must seek a means of discounting the
observed, which once would have lacked the staying power to raise a legal concern.
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the memory is private and not capable of marking the character
of the isolated nonplace anything more than “planned, sterile,
and transient.”
There are tentative attempts at creating laws to
regulate nonplaces, such as regulation of roadside crosses, but
no conceptual glue to bring together a legal theory of the
nonplace. There are virtually no regulations covering the use of
surveillance cameras to monitor public places.159 The widespread
acceptance of videotaping of commercial establishments is
reflected in television entertainment consisting of taped incidents
in retail establishments.160 Viewers can observe behavior
undertaken as though the place exclusively defines the
interaction as one of unilateral power with no traces in place
memory; part of the fascination is in seeing what was once
unseen—visceral power exercised in a place that permits
opportunistic violation of social distance and legal order. The
camera permits a view of the remaining power of place as
determinative through the brute “reality” of human fate and
attempts to rebut the power by a clinical observation of the
wrongdoer. The camera simultaneously enforces the domain of
law and documents the domain of unseen, hidden place as
transient power in an unprotected location.
A possible function for legal mandates could be a theory
of the public’s obligation to give the nonplace a degree of
“placeness,” supplemented by standards requiring, for example,
video monitoring, or imposing rules on private owners to avoid
159 The critical concept for all monitoring with a “beeper” that reveals evidence
that could have been discernible visually to the naked eye is the existence, or not, of
“an expectation of privacy.” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-83 (1983).
“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them in this case.” Id. at 282; see also United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 713-16 (1984) (distinguishing the expectation of privacy from a beeper in an
object carried through the streets and various private locations from the expectation of
privacy in an individual’s home). On public streets, no such expectation exists. Thus,
video monitoring of a street by commercial entities is as unregulated as is video
monitoring by police agencies. For the interior of businesses, there is legal advice to
owners to post notices that the site is subject to video monitoring, thereby deflecting by
the theory of consent any objection by customers about violation of privacy. How to Legally
Use Security Cameras to Avoid Breaking Privacy Laws, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/how_
2040855_legally-use-security-cameras-avoid.html (last visited June 19, 2013). The
permission to enhance what can be detected with human senses, were the human positioned
to use his senses, seemingly opens most activity outside the home to detection and
recordation by powerful video equipment. The expansion of the reach of the senses in part
redefines place, which has a deep association with the reach of the human senses. In
contrast, it also helps to regulate unplaces, affording some possibility of enhanced
security, or punishment of wrongdoers when deterrence fails.
160 Caught on Camera (MSNBC television broadcast 2008–2013) presents
miscellaneous videos that show store robberies and, occasionally, home invasions.
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the menacing features of a nonplace. Laws requiring the
cleanup of blighted properties are an example.
C.

Imaginary Place As Stand-in for Power

Indeed, the lack of a representative record of events in a
place is increasingly seen as an erasure of place, a masking of a
shareable imprint of meaning in a place by an anarchic
moment that requires admission into the city gate of collective
perception, else depriving the physical world of the feature of
place in which we live: representations that give place textual
weight to study and re-experience. The Boston bombing
established itself as a comprehensible event in a place—once the
video cameras delivered the visual record of action in a place to
our collective perception and allowed a cartography of mass
murder to form through our shared glimpse of a moment in a
physically recognizable Boston location.161 The drive to see the
video of the crime was not merely to find the culprits, but to read
the text of the place and time and help make it a collective
cultural moment—in a place. The video does not just help nab
the bombers; it creates a place memory with a narrative. For
the place to be as real as place can be, its recreation with
avatars would be ideal. Chance recordings that lack staging by
a director and thus editing for continuity are not a satisfying
depiction of an iconic moment in a place. Reconstructed reality
can provide the “realism” that small glimpses in a camera
aimed incidentally at the event do not convey.162
In the aftermath of the San Francisco plane crash, captured
by chance on video, there have been puzzled questions about the
absence of cameras to capture all aircraft landings.163 The

See NICHOLAS OF CUSA, supra note 74.
Courtrooms are increasingly assisted by technology to simulate events
visually to persuade juries more effectively of a favored narrative of an event. See, e.g.,
Jeff Aresty, Daniel Rainey & James Cormie, State Courts and the Transformation to
Virtual Courts, 39 LITIG. 50, 52 (2013) (“With the ubiquity of high-resolution flatscreen televisions, litigators employ dramatic reconstruction of accidents and distill
complex issues with simple video explanations. Today’s lawyer does not need words to
explain his or her theory of the accident. Instead, the lawyer can present a dramatic
video interpretation with computer generated actors and digitally recreated scenes.
Add to this the advancements in multimedia programs and the litigator’s ability to
convince a jury increases dramatically.”).
163 See Daro Felch, Comment to 2 Killed, Many Injured as Plane Crash Lands
at San Francisco Airport, BUZZFEED (July 6, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
adriancarrasquillo/fire-rages-as-plane-crash-lands-at-san-francisco-airport (“How come
there are no cameras where planes take-off and land[?]”); Eric Lee Shively, Comment
to Horrifying Raw Video: Asiana Flight 214 Crash Landing Caught on Film, BLAZE
161
162
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realization dawns that airport landing strips are deserts for
perception yet locations of fraught moments that call for place to be
created and preserved—by cameras. Once the landing of an
airplane was seen as an incongruity in its apparitional appearance
in a remote place; now the failure to assure the “placeness” of the
moment of landing, that is, to make it meaningful and not merely
transient, is remarked upon as a strange failure of human
connection. Legal obligations to record certain unobserved
moments of critical importance address the demand to infuse
nonplaces with the possibilities of human memory—and enhanced
legal accountability and risk management.
VI.

SELECTED PLACE-RELATED LEGAL SUBJECTS: A PARTIAL
COMPILATION164

A partial review of treatise-style compilations of doctrine
on manifestly place-infused topics provides a beginning listing of
the types of standard Restatement treatments that could be
reorganized to catalogue a ground level review of place in the law
of proximity, location, space, and boundary. From the most
abstract foundations using place to organize a structure of law
(e.g., sovereignty, citizenship, territorial dominion), to a referent
to something tangible yet linked to an existing domain (e.g.,
rights of coastal areas to the adjacent sea), to a concrete referent
for a simple legal obligation (e.g., the definition of “garage” in an
insurance contract), one can begin to frame the range of concerns
that share the commonality of reasoning about place, territory,
proximity, geography, and so on.165 Within the scope of this article,

(July 7, 2013, 2:29 PM) (“Whats [sic] sad [is] that there are no cameras at our
airports . . . TSA has no cameras or videos at our airports . . . Sad[.]”).
164 A more thorough yet still non-comprehensive list also includes: Food &
Agriculture Law; Criminal Law and Defense of Home; Place and Moral Significance;
Overlapping Places; Nonplace Regulation; Place-Literal Jurisdiction, Arbitrary Place
Consequences; Place-Literal Rules: Marriage; Place-Modified Citizenship; ConquestModified Place; Metaphorical Place-Defined Enclosures; Place-Enforced Disassociation;
Law-Stipulated Place Lines; Identity-Forming/Intensifying Place; Sacred Place; Lost Place;
and Ruin Porn. This list is a product of the author’s lengthy deliberations on the subject.
165 Allan Ebersen provides a starting point for analyzing spatial concepts in
the Constitution by examining textual references to spaces that create a formal
typology of space, while noting the overlaps that arise between multiple constitutional
spaces and a given physical space. See Allan Ebersen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 1168, 1168-69 (2011) (indicating that his “analysis shows that many discrete
problems on which scholars have focused—such as the rights of U.S. military detainees
abroad and the extraterritorial reach of state law—are manifestations of a broader
phenomenon that exists because of indeterminacy in the Constitution’s typology of
spaces”). In Ebersen’s words, “The Article . . . provides a foundation for future
scholarship addressing a wide range of constitutional questions linked to the
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it is not possible to create a comprehensive list, but a beginning
selection can suggest the richness of place as a presence
throughout legal materials, at every possible level of abstraction or
specific use. Besides grasping the range implicated in legal
materials by place ideas and topics, one can begin to identify and
analyze consistency and inconsistency in the logical constructs for
handling identity, obligations and rights, and the scope of the “law
of place” by examining how location as a concrete measurement or
a conceptual frame constructs doctrine.
A.

Maps and Cartography as a Source of Legal Issues

The enterprise that deals with place as its primary
concern is cartography, or map-making. Because place is the basic
feature that orients people to the world as a physical fact, and a
form by which the configuration of nations, counties, and towns
are imposed and sovereignty announced, maps are a natural
source of conflict. Mistakes in maps, or simple disagreement
about the traditional lines to be captured in a map, can generate
long-term sovereign conflict, or neighborhood disputes.166 They
can also generate tort litigation if the misplacement of a tower on
an aviation map causes an aviation accident.167
Map-making is a close partner to physical
reconfiguration of communities, re-engineering of ecology, and
imposing the layout that defines a region. Mapping is the
means by which transportation is laid out to make the far near,
and the near far.168
B.

The Workplace Landscape

Puzzles affecting the logic of law arise and call for refreshed
compilation, as with the regulation of the workplace: what rules of
employer responsibility apply to the workplace when it is
boundaries and status of discrete spaces.” Id. at 1169. Thus, Ebersen has provided one
template for the development of a set of “boundary” principles by an ALI project.
166 John D. Sutter, Google Maps Border Becomes Part of International Dispute,
CNN (Nov. 5, 2010) (concerning possible mistake in Google map and subsequent
dispute between Nicaragua and Cost Rica), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/11/
05/nicaragua.raid.google.maps/.
167 Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449, 450-51 (6th Cir. 1980).
168 WHITE, supra note 98, at xxix (2011) (referring to making “the far near” but
also to “render[ing] . . . space radically unstable and seemingly subject to the whims of
distant corporations”); see also id. at 140-78 (describing in comprehensive detail the
development of “the politics of space” as a result of the ability of the railroads to impose
maps and create pricing that altered practical distances for towns); JOHNSON, supra
note 4, at 11 (“Rather than inhabiting space, merchant capital made it, fabricating
connections and annihilating distances according to rates of interest and freight . . . .”).
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transferred by technology to the home?169 What of injuries to
workers that arise from the physical re-creation of a work
environment away from direct employer control? Does the
convenience of work from home privatize the risks of employment?
Does it effectively transfer the costs of work risk and office design
to the worker? Might it become part of a trend to relieve employers
of obligations to workers?170 If so, could work in the home provide
not only flexibility, but a return to greater autonomy for workers of
the kind that was reduced and even eliminated by the movement of
work into industrial and office settings and away from farms and
cottage industries? Is regulation of the home-work environment a
good form of protective law that disciplines bargaining, or is
bargaining, and common law apportionment of risk, acceptable
outside the context of nineteenth century mechanization and largescale on-site work?
The grand project for thinking about these issues of
rationalizing doctrine in a new configuration of the place for
work is not merely one of picking and choosing policy answers
derived from regulatory schemes to protect workers in an
industrial or cubicle setting. Rather, creating a new ontology of
social space171 as it relates to law is the scope of the project; the
worker—a physical being in a physical space that produces
products and awards the right to its owners to structure and
even to control his movements, monitor his time and
productivity in directly observable units, control the manner of
the “sheathing of his body,”172 and test his bodily emissions for
169

For this question, I am grateful for my conversations with a staff member

of the A.L.I.
170 The Labor Department provides a review of questions and answers about
legal issues for at-home work that considers issues of liability for workplace injuries,
non-discrimination in assigning or not assigning employees to at-home work
placement, requirements for paying wages, rules on reasonable accommodations for
disability, limitations on imposing business costs on workers with the effect of reducing
wages, and so forth. See Pandemic Flu and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Questions
and Answers, WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/
healthcare/flu_FLSA.htm (last visited June 14, 2013). In addition, the ordinary rules of
tort could apply if the at-home work site is not safe and the employer has failed to take
measures to protect home workers.
171 Delaney, in analyzing assumptions about territoriality as the basis for
legal jurisdiction and for the assumed “containment” of social phenomena within
borders, draws attention to the work of Jan Art Scholte, who has argued that
“globalization calls into question the prevailing territorialist ontology of social theory”
and has described a need for “a new, non-territorial cartography of social life.” See
DELANEY, supra note 20, at 68 (quoting J.A. Scholte, Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a
Critical Theory of Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 48-49
(Eleanore Kofman & Gillian Young eds., 1996)).
172 Id. at 66-69 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF
THE PUBLIC ORDER 38 (1971)) (on the sheathing of the body by skin, and by a layer of
clothing as a form of “egocentric territoriality”).

804

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

drugs—recovers and re-configures his control over personal
movements and bodily boundaries in home settings for work.
Additionally, consider the developments of workplace
spaces for white-collar workers. The designers of workspaces
for white collar work sought efficiency in the uses of space, and
set up workplaces that lacked privacy. The legal system
generally did not intervene to establish norms for white-collar
workspaces. Yet studies have shown that the type of workspace
that enables white collar workers to concentrate and be
productive is one that mimics a well-designed home, with nooks
for privacy, individual spaces for each family member’s avocations
and interests, and a comforting feeling of enclosure.173 For whitecollar workers, the dimension of time has been regulated to
protect their welfare, within limits,174 but space is not a legal
subject.175 By contrast, occupational safety emerged as a concern
in the United States as a result of the labor movement,
responding to a history of disasters caused by the use of space to
maximize profit with no regard for worker safety or simple
human needs. Disasters now associated with the third world
garment industry were once a factor in the United States.176 As
173 WITOLD RYBCYNSKI, HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 226-32 (1986);
see also Home Sweet Office: Comfort in the Workplace, HERMAN MILLER,
http://www.hermanmiller.com/research/research-summaries/home-sweet-office-comfort-inthe-workplace.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (summarizing studies of the advantages
of perceived comfort for worker satisfaction and productivity).
174 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2011). For compliance guidelines, see Compliance
Assistance Materials, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/compflsa.htmhttp://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-flsa.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
175 But see infra note 178.
176 Nineteenth century American diarist George Templeton Strong provided a
vivid impression of the disastrous implications of an unregulated industrial workplace
during the Industrial Revolution in the Northeast United States:

News today of a fearful tragedy at Lawrence, Massachusetts, one of the
wholesale murders commonly known in newspaper literature as accident or
catastrophe. A huge factory, long notoriously insecure and ill-built, requiring
to be patched and bandaged up with iron plates and braces to stand the
introduction of its machinery, suddenly collapsed into a heap of ruins
yesterday afternoon without the smallest provocation. Some five or six
hundred operatives went down with it—young girls and women mostly. An
hour or two later, while people were working frantically to dig out some two
hundred still under the ruins, many of them alive and calling for help, some
quite unhurt, fire caught the great pile of debris, and these prisoners were
roasted. It is too atrocious and horrible to think of.
Of course, nobody will be hanged. Somebody has murdered about two
hundred people, many of them with hideous torture, in order to save money,
but society has no avenging gibbet for the respectable millionaire and
homicide. Of course not. He did not want to or mean to do this massacre; on
the whole, he probably would have preferred to let these people live. His
intent was not homicidal. He merely thought a great deal about making a
large profit and very little about the security of human life.
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a result, some overt regulation of place is an outgrowth of a
workers’ rights movement.
But for neither industrial workers nor white-collar
workers is the insight gained from knowledge accumulated by
architecture and design work for the middle class incorporated
into legal rules for the workplace. The aspiration is minimal
standards that avoid harm to health, but not for the design of
places for work with sufficient attention to reproducing the
comfort and benefits of a well-designed home.177 The concerns for
workers primarily relate to basic physical needs: enough room to
move around and store tools, sufficient lighting, prevention of
loud noise and vibration, a reasonable temperature, protection
from second-hand smoke, access to toilets and break rooms, and
access to first aid.178 Some architects seek designs that inspire
collaboration and solitary work, in a mixture of spaces conducive
to spurts of intensity, relaxation, creativity, and focus,179 but the
standard for the workplace does not seek to alleviate the problems
identified in the twentieth-century literature emphasizing how
the configuration of assembly lines and office cubicles alienates
and damages workers. Law has not sought to regulate and shape
space for work to protect the human spirit. The dystopian view of
long halls with closed doors containing isolated office workers does
not attract legal regulation of the nuances of space for work life or
human satisfaction. The market, not law, addresses the part of
human flourishing within space as a means of increasing the
return on investment.
Yet law has some role in “architectural regulation,”180
the term devised by Larry Lessig to describe the capacity of law
to regulate by reconfiguring standards for physical spaces and
setting design specifications for processes and technologies
that, unnoticed by the user, structure her interactions with
other users and services. Architectural regulation has a mission
opposite to the visibility described by the figure of the city gates
and imputed to the “moral inches” of child birth. Sensory
THE DIARY OF TEMPLETON STRONG: THE CIVIL WAR 1860–1865 4 (Allan Nevins &
Milton Halsey Thomas eds., 1952).
177 RYBCZNSKI, supra note 173, at 228.
178 Loos, Noise, Heat, Light . . . Six Things You Need to Know About Workplace
Rules, LAW DONUT, http://www.lawdonut.co.uk/law/health-and-safety/loos-noise-heatlight-six-things-you-need-to-know-about-workplace-rules (last visited May 19, 2013).
179 Piers Fawkes, Your Next Office Will Look Like a Pop-Up Shop (Future of Work),
PSFK.COM (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.psfk.com/2013/02/pop-up-office-future-of-work.html.
180 See Tien, supra note 55, at 1 (citing Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The
Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553
(1998)); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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impressions come randomly through the city gates to all, and are
constructed for wide receipt by inclusion in a legal text verbally
mapping the female body. By contrast, the unseen structure that
channels daily activities allows for law to alter the spaces around
which evolving habits and behaviors shaped by design choices are
clustered. These “architecturally regulated” spaces are not
understood by users of the structured setting to be a product of
design. They seem a natural environment insofar as they attract
notice. They channel behavior by altering apparent choices, hence
reducing the need for regulation to control behavior. Design is
decisive. The architecture metaphor recognizes that place as a
social context is manipulated and presented as natural, both in
the physical world and in the unseen world of technology.181 The
alteration of place by forms of manipulation and by technology
design, and by the mere existence and use of technological
methods, has effects that cancel physical place as a brute fact
but also overcome the sheltering features of physical place.
Imagining a shift in the “cartography of social life”
invites systematic reasoning about the worker’s relation to a
space that shapes his identity, to his own bodily “territory and
boundaries,” and to the autonomy of labor. The new technology
permits distance health treatment, including psychotherapy that
utilizes avatars in “immersive virtual reality.”182 Practicing
therapy remotely raises numerous legal issues, including the
geographic control over professional licensing, encryption to
secure patient confidences, and numerous telehealth laws and
regulations.183 Aligning legal doctrine in accordance with a
181 Tien, supra note 55, at 11 (“The metaphor of ‘architecture’ suggests that
architectural regulation possesses a structural nature, i.e., it is built into or embedded in the
practical conditions of everyday life. Two obvious candidates for architecting are the things
we use – equipment – as well as social settings, most of which contain equipment. This
metaphor also suggests the important role of architects: those actors or groups, or
successions of actors, who designed or shaped equipment and social settings.”).
182 Tori DeAngelis, A Second Life for Practice?, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 48 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/
03/avatars.aspx.

These virtual environments are computer-simulated interactive spaces that
appear and feel to users like they’re inhabiting a relatively real setting. They
are often populated by avatars that interact, talk, gesture, walk and
“teleport”—travel to any location they choose. Virtual environments create a
feeling of person-to-person presence and immersion—the sense of actually
sharing a space with others.
Id.
183 Tori DeAngelis, Practicing Distance Therapy, Legally and Ethically, 43 AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 52 (2012). For the level of legal contract
protections for a free online 3D virtual world called Second Life, see the extended legal
provisions posted as Terms of Service, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/
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coherent conception of the effects of newly fluid notions of the site
for work demands new efforts at compilation and rationalization.
If place for work is privatized, is law’s domain reduced?184
If place is transcended, as with DNA tests that overcome the need
for place-tied embodiment and hence reduce the limitations of place
for capturing the physical proofs of crime, are the rules of search
and seizure so altered as to undermine core understandings about
the protections of the Fourth Amendment?185 Should place as brute
fact be privileged as the natural order permitting concealment or
should the tools of detection be accepted as a means of overcoming
the power of place to inflict unaccountable harms?
C.

Place and the Dead: Parks, Crimes, and Remains of War
and Terror

The dead remain with us and also have a claim on place.
The dead alter place even when they are forgotten by later
residents in the same place. Most churches in English villages are
said to sit below ground level.186 Simple math explains why. In a
small English village of about 250 people, one might expect 1,000
deaths in a century. Over a period of centuries, the number of
bodies becomes as many as 20,000, a mass which causes the
ground to rise.187
State statutes contain regulations of cemeteries with
norms and standards for the relationship of the remains of the
dead to place. Though the centuries over which the dead occupy
a place effaces all memory of their presence or who they are,
the presently living seek to protect the connection of the dead
to a place. One purpose of the regulations is to assure the
continuing respectful treatment of the remains of the dead and
their connection to a place, within a measured proximity.188 The
tos.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (addressing various topics that vary from time to
time, such as Online Service, Content License and Intellectual Property Rights,
Eligibility to Use the Service, Privacy and Your Personal Information, Dispute
Resolution and Arbitration).
184 Marc Poirier comments: “Well, yes. Federal regulation of the workplace, as
of the First Amendment—public/private matters tremendously.” E-mail from Marc
Poirier, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, to author (Aug. 30,
2013, 7:30 PM EST) (on file with author) (paragraphing omitted).
185 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
186 See BILL BRYSON, AT HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE 4-5 (2011)
187 Id. at 5.
188 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 128.44 (2013) (“That when any cemetery shall be
vacated as provided in this act, the said trustees or common council shall cause all the
dead bodies and remains buried in such cemetery to be re-interred in the cemetery of
such city or village, if they have one, and if not, then in some suitable cemetery not
more than 6 miles from the nearest corporate limits of said city or village in a prudent,
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insistence of proximity is for the dignity of the dead, but is
entombed within an expectation of memory by the living—a
memory connected to place, yet presumed to matter for the
living wherever relocated and outside of the limits of time and
memory. When the dead experience motion in transport, the
hearse carrying them slows and other drivers do as well. When
they travel alone, as in an urn, someone must sign a receipt
acknowledging their welcome to a place with an address.189
Traumatic deaths in a previously ordinary place trigger
powerful emotions about the liminal sacredness of places
defined by the instant of death. If remains cannot be reliably
removed to the custody of survivors, the place remains the
emotional center of grief and contestation over its return to
secular uses.190 Emotions about the significance of the place of
the moment of dying have gravitated to a practice of
“communally and anonymously created” spontaneous shrines
in proximity to the place of unexpected death.191 Roadside
crosses are a manifestation of private focus on the place of a
loved one’s death, although they are rarely a point for
careful and respectful manner, and shall cause to be removed and again erected over
the proper remains, all permanent fences around graves and lots, all tombstones and
monuments, with as little injury as the case will admit, Provided, That no removal of
said bodies and remains shall be made during the months of June, July, August or
September, such removal, and the costs of the proceedings under this act, shall be at
the expense of and paid by the city or village in which such cemetery is located.”).
189 DMM Revision: Mailing of Cremated Remains, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE (Aug. 23,
2012), http://about.usps.com/postal-bulletin/2012/pb22344/html/updt_002.htm (“Human
ashes (cremated remains) are permitted to be mailed provided they are in a strong and
durable container and packaged as required in 9.2. The identity of the contents should be
marked on the address side. Mailpieces sent to domestic addresses must be sent via Express
Mail® or Registered Mail® service.”). Concern for place and human remains extends to
hesitation to permit human burials in pet cemeteries, and produces warnings and
regulations if the desire for interment in a pet burial ground is allowed. Kristen Seymour,
With Fido Forever: Owners Who Want to Be Buried in Pet Cemeteries, TODAY (Jan. 27, 2012,
11:22 AM), http://www.today.com/id/46044474/ns/today-today_pets/t/fido-forever-ownerswho-want-be-buried-pet-cemeteries/#.UdsKQ7HD_rc (“New York pet cemeteries may not
advertise or charge for the burial of cremated human remains, and humans wishing to be
interred in a pet cemetery must receive written notice that their remains will not be covered
by the protections and legal rights granted to human cemeteries.”).
190 Frazier Moore, ‘Sacred Ground’ Charts a Stormy Planning Process to
Rebuild at Ground Zero, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (Sept. 1, 2004), http://jacksonville.com/
apnews/stories/090104/D84QE56G2.shtml; see KENNETH E. FOOTE, SHADOWED
GROUND: AMERICAN’S LANDSCAPE OF VIOLENCE AND TRAGEDY 335-45 (rev. ed. 2003).
Foote identifies a trend, in light of rapid development of a memorial to the victims of
the Oklahoma bombing and plans for a 9/11 living memorial, to acknowledge the
connection of places to trauma. “Explicit in the planning [for the Oklahoma site] were
efforts to anchor memory in a specific site, interpret the meaning in nearby exhibitions,
preserve evidence of the trauma in archival collections, and disseminate knowledge of
the event . . . .” Id. at 341.
191 See Sylvia Grider, Spontaneous Shrines and Public Memorialization, in DEATH
AND RELIGION IN A CHANGING WORLD 246, 248 (Katherine Garces-Foley ed., 2006).
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strangers to pause or gather.192 Roadside crosses attract
controversy, with strong criticisms, fervent defense, and legal
regulation.193 Some jurisdictions ban them, some enact legal
protection, and some create standardization.194 Because those
who place the crosses ignore the law’s efforts to ban or limit
them on state property, the crosses return if removed and
thereby “creat[e] a dialog between the vernacular process and
official attempts at control.”195
Claiming space as sacred and communally available
outside the purview of legal entitlements is a microcosm of the
mysteries of place as core to defining meanings in the world,
elusive to logical exegesis, and persistently present in the
claimed domain of law. It should be possible to frame principles to
guide law in responding to the ways in which ordinary space, or
even a nonplace, assumes a sacred/secular meaning to which
dignitary interests attach. The permanent withdrawal of spaces
from ordinary regulation is unrealistic, so principles could be
fashioned to address the temporal claim on markings and
preservation while disciplining the reach of such claims. As the
purely physical conception of the world recedes, and the physical
and the imaginary mingle in new ways, law confronts a need to
formulate doctrines that respond to evolving human
perceptions of place’s significance.
D.

Place as Touchstone for Secular/Sacred Function:
Folktales of Place and Justice

On a meta level and a micro level, place grounds a claim
to exclusive control over certain functions. Because nations are
always defined with respect to landmass, only a sovereign with
authority over a landmass can make the claims associated with
sovereignty. Among these is the critical monopoly on justice
explained by Robert Cover in Folktales of Justice.196 Cover
quotes President Charles DeGaulle, in refusing permission to
Sartre to hold a tribunal on French soil for judging American
192 Id. at 259 (noting that “[f]ew passers-by . . . ever stop and look carefully”).
Indeed, these roadside shrines create a moment of reflection for the motorist on
physical proximity, anonymity, and the capacity of the sacred to sustain its meaning
where personal movement, or “automobility,” is the dominant motif.
193 For a debate about their contested nature, see Room for Debate, Should
Roadside Memorials Be Banned, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2009, 7:00 PM),
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/should-roadside-memorials-be-banned/.
194 Grider, supra note 191, at 259.
195 Id. at 260.
196 Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.
L. REV. 179 (1985).
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war crimes in Vietnam, instructing the philosopher about the
state monopoly over the dispensing of law: “I have no need to
tell you that justice of any sort, in principle as in execution,
emanates from the State.”197
For Sartre, justice transcends place; most injustice occurs
in the physical world, where harm can be made destructive of life,
limb, and shelter. But imposing justice need not be confined to the
claims of place; knowledge is outside of place. The possibilities for
assembling evidence, advocates, and judges are factually beyond
the limitations of place; today, since Sartre, the means of
constituting a capacity for judgment, condemnation, and rebuke,
with moral effects, is relatively unconfined by the claims of
physical place, though the sovereign tied to State control over
place does not lack means to respond.
The salient example of the ability to overcome state
control over territory is the success of Wikileaks in exposing
government secrets that subject governments to public
accountability for activities leaders wish to conceal.198 The quest
for justice for events located in time and place that Sartre
attempted to pursue, necessarily in a physical place, now occurs
in the reconstituted public location that no sovereign can
disassemble.199 Sovereigns can block dissemination in a locally
controlled web, but cannot expunge from the “world wide web”
information obtained by remote means and used to expose a
sovereign power’s rights and wrongs.200
197 Id. at 201 (quoting letter from DeGaulle to Sartre, Apr. 19, 1967, in
AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELL INTERNATIONAL WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL (John Duffet ed., 1968)).
198 See, e.g., Elizabeth Heron & Stephen Farrell, The War Logs: Newly Disclosed
Iraq War Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2010, 5:03 PM), http://atwar.blog.nytimes.com/
2010/10/22/iraq-war-reports/ (second cache of documents from archives of wars by U.S. in
the Middle East, published by the New York Times after consulting with the Pentagon). The
ability of the sovereign to push back can be seen in the confinement of Julian Assange to the
London embassy of Ecuador, the imprisonment of Bradley Manning, and the exile of
Edward Snowden in Russia, all in places over which sovereigns determine their status.
John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya, In Embassy Drama, Eyes of Police (and Public) Focus on
Assange, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/world/
europe/julian-assange-under-watch-at-ecuadorean-embassy.html; Charlie Savage, Manning
Is Acquitted of Aiding the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/us/bradley-manning-verdict.html (describing acquittal
of Bradley Manning for releasing classified documents but Manning’s conviction for
violation of the Espionage Act of 1917); Steven Lee Myers & Andrew E. Kramer, Defiant
Russia Grants Snowden Year’s Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, at A1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/europe/edward-snowden-russia.html.
199 Cover, supra note 196, at 121.
200 The material released by Edward Snowden had multiple custodians able to
prevent its destruction in any one place, yet the British government engaged in the
futile exercise, enabled by control of physical location but frustrated by the unphysicality of information on the path to becoming viral, of physically destroying hard
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The traditional power of the sovereign to suppress
information through control over place—offices, paper files,
secured communications—begins to dissolve when determined
insiders-turned-outsiders can duplicate and scatter digital copies
of state secrets.201 The state’s monopoly of lawful physical force
within land boundaries is no longer sufficient to impose an
information blackout on official secrets.
VII.

SUGGESTIONS FOR STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE
AFFECTING CERTAIN PLACE TOPICS

The following are tentative examples of principles that
might be drafted to address issues affecting the role or
regulation of place in specific legal areas.
A.

Place in the Provision of Medical Treatment

Regulation of place in connection with the provision of
medical treatment should be fashioned to support patient privacy,
to facilitate consultation with medical personnel authorized to
provide advice in a confidential setting free of outside monitors, to
allow maximum patient autonomy without non-medically
indicated intrusion on home settings in which patients may
privately administer prescribed medications with adequate access
to remote communication in the event of complications, and to
avoid medically unnecessary technological depictions of the
internal organs of the body that violate the normal physical
boundaries of the human anatomy.202 The patient should enjoy
drives at the Guardian newspaper. See Julian Borger, NSA Files: Why the Guardian in
London Destroyed Hard Drives of Leaked Files, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2013, 1:23 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/nsa-snowden-files-drives-destroyed-london.
201 James Risen, Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files to Russia, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/world/snowden-says-he-took-no-secretfiles-to-russia.html (explaining his concern about secret spying programs and his view
that the only means of expressing opposition to the spying program was to go outside
the control over employees by the National Security Agency).
202 This statement of multiple purposes in the law regulating the provision of
medical care bears some resemblance to the mixture of purposes in criminal law
discussed in Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401 (1958). Hart suggested certain modifications, at a level of generality that
sought to capture humane principles, in the Statement of Purposes contained in the
first draft of the Model Penal Code, e.g.,
(a) To foster the development of personal capacity for responsible decision to
the end that every individual may realize his potentialities as a participating
and contributing member of his community:
(b) To declare the obligation of every competent person to comply with (1)
those standards of behavior which a responsible individual should know are
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the maximum control over the space which he/she occupies for the
medical treatment required, in the medical judgment of an
attending physician satisfactory to the patient, for prudent
administration or provision of medical service. Care should be
taken in prescribing minimal standards for a facility in which
medical services are provided to avoid the imposition of
unnecessary cost if it is reasonably foreseeable that such cost may
impair access to the service for which a facility is intended. Cost–
benefit analysis may be used to assess the need for specified
standards for a facility, with experiential data utilized to achieve
an objective assessment of cost and benefit. Providers of medical
services should be encouraged to utilize technology to increase
access to medical services by persons in need of medical service in
remote locations. Remote consultation with patients, as by
teleconferencing and like technology, should be deployed in the
interests of patients located at a distance from a physical facility
and in the interests of patient privacy and confidential receipt of
medical services.
The regulation of the place in which medical services
are provided, or of the human body itself as a place, should have
no purpose other than protecting and advancing the safety and
autonomy of the patient. Viewing the internal organs should be a
matter of patient choice, and technology creating images of the
internal organs should be used only with patient consent or as a
result of medical necessity. Place in connection with medical
services should consider the deeply rooted tradition of privacy
originating in the home, a traditional site for autonomous care of
individual medical needs under conditions of autonomy. Medical
facilities should provide an emotionally supportive setting for all
patients, with reasonable access to patients by volunteers
providing psychological comfort and group support for patients
who wish to have their presence. Patients should be given full
access to information kiosks and other forms of full disclosure of
the array of support groups available to advise, counsel, and
comfort them. Restrictions on medical procedures should not
depend upon a non-medical mandate relating to anatomical
features of the body but to commonly accepted protocols on
imposed by the conditions of community life if the benefits of community
living are to be realized, and (2) those further obligations of conduct, specially
declared by the legislature, which the individual either in fact knows or has
good reason to know he is supposed to comply with, and to prevent violations
of these basic obligations of good citizenship by providing for public
condemnation of the violations and appropriate treatment of the violators[.]
Id. at 440-41.
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prudent medical methods for the preservation of the patient’s
life and health.
B.

Place in the Practice of Psychiatry and the Provision of
Psychological Counseling

Working with professional associations, states should
develop protocols for the practice of psychiatry and the
provision of psychological counseling using commonly approved
techniques involving remote technology, experimentation with
online simulations, and writing medical prescriptions across state
lines. Such protocols should avoid imposing restrictions on the use
of technology across state lines if they are permitted in-state. In
addition, states should seek to advance knowledge of techniques
that can reduce cost to clients, improve therapeutic results with
forms of sound technological innovation that creates virtual
interactive experiences, and, in the delivery of services through
remote connections, protect privacy. Professional associations
should incorporate the most advanced protective features into
technology that protect patient privacy, with periodic audits of
the security of existing client protection.
C.

Place in Access to Marriage

Principles that are anchored to systematic thinking
about the rational weight that place can bear in arranging legal
rights have the potential to move forward one area of mixed
common law doctrine and statutory law. Today, statutory
marriage law in the form of licensing regimes has a large impact
on the ability of couples to marry without regard to their current
physical location, either apart from one another and unable to
travel, or in a jurisdiction that denies them marriage rights.203
Typically, marriage licensing statutes require the physical
presence of both parties to the proposed marriage in the state
that issues the marriage license to the couple.204 A handful of
states permit proxy marriage, but confine it to limited
categories of person (soldiers in a war zone, the moribund).205
The rationale for permitting it for some who need distance
access but denying it to others is weak and unarticulated.206
Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 6, at 742.
Id. at 736-37.
205 Id. at 758-60.
206 Mae Kuykendall, Equality Federalism: A Solution to the Marriage Wars, 15
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 431 (2012) (citing Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th
203
204
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With the emergence of same-sex marriage in a subset of
states, same-sex couples are beginning to undertake high
visibility efforts to overcome barriers of distance from a favorable
marriage legal regime. Healthy couples routinely travel to states
to marry, and these states make some efforts to become a
marriage tourism destination. Other couples, however, require
the extraordinary aid of air ambulances contributed by supporters
to permit an ill partner to be present on the tarmac of a marriagefriendly state long enough to enter a legal American marriage. 207
Now that such marriages will be recognized by the federal
government,208 couples have strong estate planning reasons to
desire to marry, as well as symbolic concerns.
For marriage law, an appropriate treatment of place
should recognize the waning importance of physical location to
the values that marriage, as a legal construct and as an
expression of individual autonomy, is designed to support. The
place-sensitive principle of marriage law could be proposed for
reform of marriage procedure as follows.
Jurisdictions enacting marriage laws should design the
laws to afford access to their citizens, and to non-citizens for
reasonably defined needs, for access to their marriage entry
laws. States traditionally offer their marriage laws to any
couple present in their state, however briefly, with no inquiry
into the personal history of the non-residents who are provided
with marriage solemnization services. States should seek to
provide comparable access to couples who may marry under
their marriage laws even if they are out of the state. States
should experiment with safeguards relating to identity
verification and with the conditions making a couple eligible to
marry remotely under the state’s laws. Factors to consider are
inability of an ill partner to travel, presence in a foreign
jurisdiction with procedural barriers to timely provision of
marriage services or problems in recordation of marriages, and
lack of means to travel to a jurisdiction in which marriage
services are available to them. Jurisdictions should consider
offering more extensive remote access to their marriage law, but
Cir. 2012)) (rejecting state interest in enforcing an earlier deadline for voting by nonmilitary personnel compared with military voters and explaining that, “while there is a
compelling reason to provide more opportunities for military voters to cast their
ballots, there is no corresponding satisfactory reason to prevent non-military voters
from casting their ballots as well”).
207 Julie Zimmerman, To Get Married, They Left Ohio, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
(July 14, 2013), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20130714/NEWS10/307140009/.
208 Annie Lowrey, Gay Marriages in All States Get Recognition from the I.R.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at A12.
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should, at a minimum, seek to offer their marriage law on an
equitable basis to individuals not able to pass through their state
but who are precluded by their location elsewhere from receiving
the benefits of marriage law for those able to be present in the
jurisdiction. Additional charges for a remote service are
justifiable, but should not preclude access to couples of average
means. Note that the principle specifically identifies place as
lacking the weight afforded it by states who permit marriage
tourism as a means of gaining access to their marriage law but
deny access to those unable to be physically present.209
This proposed principle recommends states create some
remote access to marriage for couples with defined needs, and
suggests room for states to experiment with fee structures to
provide portable marriage law as a state service appropriate to
contemporary understandings of the receding importance of
physical location for consuming marriage law. The principle
attempts to give place a realistic influence in marriage law in
light of couples’ practices and needs, to encourage states to
expand the availability of their marriage law through
experimentation with safeguards and fee structures. It is a
principle that asks for states to consider more creative uses of
sovereignty in a world with legal spatiality that is growing
beyond the bounds of physical spatiality. The principle urges
states to offer law capaciously in light of the power of a
humanely conceived sovereignty to transcend the mixed legacy
of sovereign authority conceived as arising from force-control
over bounded land. This principle posits that states have a
moral obligation to conceive of the governing authority as an
asset that should be deployed to extend the aid of law across
209 Today, with the increasing number of states that offer same-sex marriage,
there is a compelling logic to “marriage-equality” states’ relaxing the requirement of
physical presence by the couple in the state before the officiant. A critical consideration
is the ability to use marital status for the taxation of an estate if a same-sex couple has
been legally married in a jurisdiction that authorizes same-sex marriage. The Author
has personally advised a lawyer for a couple, one of whom was too ill to travel,
concerning a United States jurisdiction which had judges willing to enter orders
requiring a clerk to record a marriage done with one party available by phone and one
party present before the judge. The couple successfully entered a marriage through a
similar means. E-mail between Mae Kuykendall, Professor of Law, Michigan State
University College of Law, and a Person Who Wishes to Remain Anonymous (Fall
2013) (as part of phone and e-mail contact regarding the means of combining same-sex
marriage and remote marriage). Because the couple does not want publicity, it is not
possible to cite correspondence. Nonetheless, the example of combining the existence of
same-sex marriage with a judicial work-around in a state that does not authorize
remote marriage indicates the propriety of and the need for explicit legislation guided
by principles of fair marriage procedure that afford to place its appropriate weight for
granting and regulating marriage access and recognition.
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space and time and expand its beneficial functions of ordering
legal rights and providing forms of protection and dignity to
those who are not physically proximate, but whose needs are
known and remediable with a larger imaginative scope for lawmaking by states.
CONCLUSION: PLACE AND LAW
A.

Does Theorizing Place Disrupt the Quest for Law as
Conceptual Order?

Could a Restatement of place have a plausible chance as
a means of further developing a coherent account of place in
legal doctrine? Or is recognition of place as an orienting feature
of law too disruptive to a claim of orderly reasoning and
justification of legal force to be compatible with a positive account
of the law? Bromley has summarized a conception of the state and
law as both deeply geographic, with the development by elites of
formalized systems of precedent as the means of imposing
centralizing authority over loosely organized villages and
communes.210 The notion is that law, with its centralizing,
territorial drive, is the enemy of social connectivity that arises in
small communities and replicates itself in similar communities
across time and space if not captured by the territorial logic of
systems of formal law.211 Does probing the logic of place lead to
critique only and not to construction and improvement of
defensible legal doctrine? Or, in contrast, might success in a
project to restate and rationalize place in the law only deepen
the grasp of precedent over the nuances and connections in
social life that wither under the force of formal logic, the
bureaucratic system, and legal authority? Is place so deeply
political and so central to law that a project to restate law
cannot absorb a direct treatment and formal rationalization of
its conceptual logic?212 Restatement attention to place might
augur an approach authorizing smaller scale projects, tethered
to manageable subsets of the larger domain, and taking
multiple forms: Restatements, Principles, and Model Codes.
210 NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 37-38
(1994) (explaining the work of Peter Kropotkin, a nineteenth century geographer/anarchist
who used imagination about geography to critique social arrangements).
211 Id.
212 Duncan Hollis, Breaking News: The Fourth Restatement on the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 23, 2012 4:18 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/10/23/breaking-news-the-fourth-restatement-on-the-foreignrelations-law-of-the-united-states/.
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The pervasiveness of place in intuitive thinking counsels
against understanding the effects of probing the logic of place in
law as purely disruptive or dangerously consolidating. With the
flux in the brute power of place, and the place metaphor
nonetheless continuing to serve as an orienting concept for
physical reality and the new mobilities transcending place and
time, law should seek a deeper account of the place “place” merits
in legal reasoning, the assignment of rights, and the
understanding of facts.
B.

Summing Up: A Plan?

One can readily conclude that place, at this point in
legal history, is most suited to a statement of principles, or, for
subsets of “the law of place,” model codes that capture the
principles that should guide the making of law in connection
with a subject for which place is a critical influence. Place as a
component of law, either overtly or implicitly, is amorphous
and uncategorized. The task of stating principles is daunting.
But the distinctive feature of criminal law was amorphous
before the ALI Principles succeeded in giving it coherence and
shape.213 Despite being understood as a loosely delineated area
of legal concern, its “aims” were insufficiently specified, which
called for decisions about the scope of an ALI treatment of
criminal law, as well as a choice about the purpose of principles
to guide it.214
For place, the first cut at an attempt to define and
organize the dimension of its role as a legal category would be
dividing up the legal universe into arenas that directly involve
the regulation of place as a legal problem. Examples might
include scheduling the use of a facility, such as a park; making
rules for the construction or regulation of buildings for habitation;
determining which legal regulator controls boundaries, such as
shorelines where loading and unloading ships occurs; defining
and regulating the physical workplace in a world of

213 Hart, supra note 202, at 401 (asserting the complexity of the purposes
animating criminal law and the need to create a statement prioritizing them).
214 Herbert Wechsler discussed the complications of bringing academic attention and
suggested principles to a body of law neglected by scholars and featuring “accidental or
fortuitous” differences among the states. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal
Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1952). As to scope, he set out the need to address threshold
definitional issues affecting the coverage of criminal law, considerations in varying sanctions
for different behavior, and a group of questions about treatment methods, extent of discretion,
and administration. Id. at 1104-45.
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telecommuting. A raw listing of such topics would permit a search
for commonalities that produce a theory of decision.215
One would then turn to the formulation of principles for
identifying place as a substantial presence in a topic area that
is not manifestly about place. For example, I have argued that
place has become the critical feature in the regulation of
reproductive health, or, more particularly, abortion. I have
made tentative suggestions for recognizing that the topic of
abortion has shifted to a regulation of place, and even to a
conception of the interior of the female body as a place. It thus
makes sense to formulate principles addressing the acceptable
treatment of abortion as a phenomenon now heavily affected by
place regulation, and to shape a legal model for a rational use of
law to support reproductive health and underlying norms for any
state control over a human body. Such a legal principle might well
rule out the treatment of the interior of a human body, because it
is observable with new technologies, as a place subject to
regulation. It might further acknowledge that regulations of the
body intended to confine its possessor to restricted locations for
receiving services or self-help, with the goal of controlling the
bodily interior, are not permitted. The shifting meaning of place
has growing significance for an area of law created by a law
review article—privacy.216
Perhaps the overarching question to ask to identify
place-infused legal subjects is, “In this area of law, in what way
are legal rights affected by images of, or facts about, proximity,
enclosure, fixed location, or comparative claims on first presence
in a location?” One practical method would be a comprehensive
review of existing legal treatises, Restatements, Principles, Model
Codes, cases and codes, and regulations, to tease out the presence
of place in each subject matter. Leading edge computer techniques
are under development to study the interconnectedness of the law,
seeking semantic connections and clusters that reveal patterns of
citation and evolution in legal doctrine.217
215 For deception, Levmore concludes: “I have suggested that even though
judges do not think of this [deception] as an area of law, the cases, though found in
disparate recognized areas, can be rationalized with a single theory, in this case the
cost-benefit or hypothetical bargain theory.” Levmore, supra note 13, at 1381.
216 Levmore, supra note 13, at 1383 (citing Samuel W. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)).
217 Michael J. Bommarito II, Daniel Martin Katz & Jon Zelner, Law as a
Seamless Web? Comparison of Various Network Representations of the United States
Supreme Court Corpus (1791–2005), PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW (June 14, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1419525.
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Next, the question might be, “Is the image one of brute
fact, or is it structured by a metaphor of place or a hypothetical
visualization of something as situated in an observable place?”
The first set of questions should probe the presence and logic of
place in the determination of legal rights and obligations by
breaking down the components of a doctrine, using a search for
some clue about the role of situatedness, observableness, and
primary claims over space. Contract law has addressed place to
minimize its incoherence; the ability in contracts to specify the
applicable law, without regard to the place of contracting,
recognizes that place does not carry a substantial weight in
creating a workable contract understanding. So contract law in
its general doctrine controls place by permitting it to be
stipulated and thus deprived of its unconsidered sway in
imposing obligations based on location. The next set of questions
should probe the rational connection of the conception of place to
the legal matter it resolves. The candidates for evaluation are
utilitarian or rights-grounded. It seems unlikely that all aspects
of place could be considered under one overriding utilitarian or
rights-concerned principle. As an example, Hart analyzed a
curative–rehabilitative framework for punishment as focusing
on the individual rather than general commands, and thus both
potentially undermining the general command and visiting
cruelty upon an individual for who he is rather than what he
did.218 Such fine-grained consideration of one purpose in one
context complicates the use of one overriding principle.
For place, many questions might be organized using the
principles that are present in other legal categories relevant to
the particular place-affected problem. For example, theories of
contract freedom could be a presence in place conceptions of the
workplace. For the trend of working in the home for an
employer, the focus is on the reclassification of a home as an
extension of the workplace, and thus in a reclassification of the
workplace in connection with employee autonomy and the
qualities of the home as a place of repose and shelter. The
question arises whether unbundling the employer’s relationship
from the employee by severing physical presence and direct
physical control over the workplace fundamentally reorders the
relationship in ways that revitalize nineteenth century
conceptions of the employee as a freely contracting individual
who assumes risks of work-related injuries and is responsible for
his own welfare. The overall context for evaluation is existing
218

Hart, supra note 202, at 407.
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labor law and workplace safety regulations. The decision about
the correct response would require extensive consideration of the
costs and benefits of existing employee-employer regulations if
transferred to the home as a worksite. A decision would call for
some evaluation of the cost benefits of current regulations for
workers physically situated in the employer’s work site. It would
also call for empirical data on the actual work environment in
homes for types of off-site work. What kinds of abuses might be
occurring? Are freely contracting technology workers effectively
absorbing the social costs of the workplace and thus benefitting
individually in ways that enhance general social welfare? Is
shifting costs and pricing of labor externalities to internalized
employee-contractor personal arrangements efficient by
avoiding over-regulation and providing greater worker control
over allocating compensation between workplace welfare and
income? Should regulations be shaped for the type of worker
and the associated risks? The overarching question is how our
conception of the social problems of the workplace is altered by
the flux in the imagined physical structure of the typical
workplace as a site of employer control and physical presence.
Does work in the home change the understanding of the worker
as subject to the physical supervision of the employer, and thus
so deprived of autonomy as to require high levels of employer
responsibility to worker welfare? Or does it enhance the need
for worker protection by regulation and legal accountability?
At the end of his treatment of deception as a possible
category of legal doctrine amenable to constructing a theory of
its principles, Levmore concedes that it is “unlikely that the
theory of deception sketched here could smoothly incorporate
all, or nearly all, the known cases in which deception plays some
role” but argues that the proposed theory “does gather in a
number of cases not previously connected and not intentionally
made consistent with one another.”219 For the role place should
have in formulating laws, regulations, and rules, there need be
no comprehensive theory tested by its capacity to explain all
cases in which place can be detected. Initial efforts at typology
and detection of core moral and logical precepts could form one
avenue to propounding model laws or principles. For certain,
the nature of place as a relatively unseen presence in legal
materials calls for careful attention to the weight it is capable
of bearing in a universe in which law supports the goals of
order, fairness, and consistency.
219

Levmore, supra note 13, at 1382.

